The provisions of Section 195 (1) (b) (ii) of the Cr.P.C. do not bar the police from investigating cognizable offenses under Sections 463, 471, 475, and 476 of the Penal Code, even if the alleged forgery was committed much earlier and later the document came to be produced or given in evidence in the court proceedings.

S.S.SANDHAWALIA, J.

1. The statutory power of the police to invesligate the cognazable offences under Section 463. 471, 475 and 476 of the Penal Code vis-a-vis the bar under S.195 (1) (b) (ii) of the Cr. P. C. with regard to the cognizance thereof by a Court, has ultimately come to be the signicant question in this reference.

2. Karnail Singh petitioner and another had instituted a civil suit on 25th of Sept. 1980, against his brother Jarnail Singh and others seeking a declaration to the effect that they were owners in possession of the said land and for a permanent unjunction against, the defendants from interfering with their possession. This claim was rested primarily on a will allegedly executed on the 27th April, 1977 by the petitioners father Hari Singh. During the pendency of the said suit Jarnail Singh aforesaid who was a defendant therein made an application before the Senior Superintendent of police, Amritsar, alleging that the will purporting to be dated the 27th April, 1977, relied upon by the petitioner had been desigendly forged and thereby the petitioner had committed the offence of cheating and forgery. On the basis of the said application a case under Ss.420, 467 and 471 of the Penal Code was registered at Police Station, Majitha, and the investigation thereof was commenced.

3. The petitioner thereafter preferred the present petition under S.482 of the Cr. P. C. 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code) seeking to quash the first information report against him and the investigation thereunder. It is the admitted position that no charge-sheet or complaint had as yet been filed in any Court of law. When the matter came up criginally before S.S. Kang J., reliance on behalf of the petitioner was placed on a single Bench judgment in Sheela Devi V/s. State of Punjab, 1979 Chand LR (Cri) 195 (P and H). Doubting the correctness of its ratio in view of the earlier Supreme Court judgments and apparently taking the view that the criminal miscellaneous petition was premature and incompetent because the matter was as yet merely at the investigative stage and no final report had been filed in any Court of law whatsoever, the learned single Judge referred the matter to a larger Bench for an authoritative decision.

4. It would appear that the aforesaid issue which had originally necessitated this reference, namely, whether a Court has the power of quashing a first information report and the consequent investigation even before a charge-sheet is filed has now been authoritatively resolved by the exhaustive judgment of the Full Bench in Vinod Kumar Sethi V/s. State of Punjab, (1982) 84 Punj LR 337: (AIR 1982 Punj and Har 372). After an elaborate discusion on principle and precedent, the matter has been opitomised as under (at pp. 381-82):

"To conclude, I see no blanket bar against the quashing of a first information report and the consequent investigation (even before a charge-sheet is filed in Court) provided that the requisite pre-conditions formulated above for the exercise of the power stand satisfied, without being exhaustive, these may be briefly summarised as under:-

(i) when the first information report, even it accepted as true, discloses no reasonable suspicion of the commission of a cognizable offence;

(ii) when the materials subsequently collected in the course of an investigaion further disclose no such cognizable offence at all:

(iii) when the continuation of such investigation would amount to an abuse of power by the police thus necessitating interference in the ends of justice; and

(iv) that even if the first information report or its subsequent investigation purports to raise a suspicion of a cognizable offence, the High Court can still quash it if it is convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised main fide."

Applying the aforesaid principles it seems to be plain that the petitioner is disentitled to the relief of quashing the first in formation report- A reference thereto (as quoted i