The decision of the Civil Court between the parties is binding on the Magistrate trying the petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and it influences the entitlement to maintenance under Section 125.

1. Respondent wife sought maintenance from her husband, petitioner herein (hereafter they are referred to as the husband and wife) under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, alleging that she had been deserted by him for reasons of bringing insufficient dowry and had been living with her parents almost from the inception of the marriage. The husband in his written statement claimed that she had deserted him on her own when he did not agree to her demand that he should adopt the cult of Sacha Sauda.

2. The trial Magistrate allowed maintenance and Revision Petition of the husband was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhatinda. The husband has invoked the inherent jurisdiction of this Court for quashing both these orders on the ground that Courts below have acted illegally and against the letter of law by not feeling bound by the Civil Court decision between the parties rendered in a petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act filed by the wife.

3. The maintenance proceedings were launched by the wife on March 22, 1977. This was after the matrimonial Court had dismissed wifes petition for restitution of congugal rights vide order dated January 19, 1977. The proceedings under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act were initiated by the wife on March 31, 1975. The very ground which was asserted in her petition under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, was the ground which she later on pleaded in her petition for maintenance. Her application for restitution of conjugal rights was dismissed by the trial Court with the finding that the petitioner had left the matrimonial home, of her own accord and it was she who had deserted her husband. This judgement was later on sustained by the High Court with the observation that she herself left her husband and therefore, she. could not obtain a decree for restitution of conjugal rights.

4. Sub-Section (4) of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is in the following terms :-

"No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance from her husband under this Section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent."

envisages that a wife shall not be entitled to receive any allowance from her husband under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure inter alia if she refuses to live with her husband.

5. The Civil Court had clearly found that it was she who had deserted her husband that means it was she who had been refusing to live, with him. Such being the case by virtue of Sub-Section (4) of Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, she would not be entitled to any allowance.

6. The next question that calls for consideration is as to whether finding in a judgement of Civil Court between the parties would be binding upon the Magistrate trying the petition under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In this regard Sub-Section (2) of Section 127 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deserves notice and it reads as under :

"Where it appears to the Magistrate that, in consequence of any decision of a competent Civil Court, any order made under Section 125 should be cancelled or varied, he shall cancel the order or, as the case may be vary the same accordingly."

7. A perusal of this Sub-Section would show that even if an order granting maintenance had been passed in favour of the wife and if thereafter a decision between the parties happens to be rendered by the Civil Court which has a bearing on the question which came up for consideration earlier before the Court dealing with the petition under Sec. 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it has to give effect to the Civil Court order by cancelling the order granting maintenance, if such is the import of the judgement of the Civil Court.

8. In the present case the Civil Court had already held against the wife by pronouncing that she was not entitled to a decree of restitution of conjugal