Sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters of assessment and computation of house tax under Section 61 (1) (a) of the said Act.

S.S.SANDHAWALIA, J.

1. Whether Sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act would bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in matters of assessment and computation of house tax under Section 61 (1) (a) of the said Act is the significant question which has necessitated this reference to the Division Bench.

2. We take the view that the controversy now stands concluded by the recent decision of the final Court in Munshi Ram V/s. Municipal Committee, Chheharta, AIR 1979 SC 1250 and it is, therefore, unnecessary to elaborate the matter on principle in any great detail.

3. The facts giving rise to the question call for a brief notice. The appellant along with Bal Krishan preferred a suit for a permanent injunction restraining the respondent-Municipality from recovering the amount of Rs. 300/- on account of house tax in respect of property No. 659 for the assessment year 1978-79 with the added relief of the recovery of Rs. 270/- alleged to have been illegally recovered by the respondent in respect of the abovesaid property in the previous assessment year. It was averred that the appellants had remained in possession of the property for the last about forty years and it was for the first time in the assessment year 1976-77 that it was sought to assess the house tax at the annual letting value of Rs. 2,400/-. On objections being preferred by them the annual letting value was reduced to Rs. 2,000/-. They preferred an appeal under Section 84 of the Punjab Municipal Act against the said assessment, but the same was dismissed by the Additional Deputy Commissioner, Gurdaspur. Consequently the appellants deposited a sum of Rs. 270/- as house tax. Later the respondent-Municipal Committee issued a notice for the year 1977-78 demanding Rs. 300/- as house tax on the basis of the earlier assessment. The suit was resisted by the respondent-Municipal Committee inter alia on the ground that the civil Courts had no jurisdiction to try the same in view of the bar created by Sections 84 and 86 of the Punjab Municipal Act.

On the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed:-

1. Whether the assessment, orders for the years 1976-77 and 1977-78 are illegal, void and without jurisdiction as alleged?

2. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the injunction prayed for?

3. Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the present suit?

4. Relief.

Holding that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was barred, the trial Court decided all the three issues against the plaintiffs. An appeal against this judgment was carried which was heard and disposed of by the Additional District Judge, Gurdaspur. In a considered judgment the findings of the trial Court on all the three issues were affirmed.

4. At the motion stage itself some conflict of precedent was highlighted and Harbans Lal, J., referred the matter for an authoritative decision by a larger Bench and that is how the appeal is before us.

5. It is manifest that the question is pristinely a legal one and as has already been indicated at the outset now it seems to be covered in favour of the respondent-Municipal Committee by the decision in Munshi Ram s case (AIR 1979 SC 1250) (supra) which appears to us as being virtually on all fours. It, therefore, suffices to mention that in the said case the appellants had been assessed to profession tax under Section 61 (1) (b) of the Punjab Municipal Act. They challenged the said assessment by way of a suit on the ground that in assessing the Municipal Committee had wholly exceeded its statutory powers under the aforesaid provision. The trial Court dismissed the suit but on appeal the Additional District Judge reversed the judgment and decreed the suit. This in turn was affirmed in second appeal by the learned single Judge but on a Letters Patent Appeal having been preferred on behalf of the Municipal Committee, the Division Bench reversed the learned single Judge s decision on the finding that Sections 84 and 86 of the Act bar the juris