The time for filing an appeal under Section 454(1), Cr.P.C. begins to run from the date of the order of disposal of property by the Magistrate, and not from the date of dismissal of the leave application.

1. This revision is directed against the order dated 17-9-1978 passed by the Sessions judge, Cuttack dismissing the appeal of the petitioner under S. 454, Cr. P. C. registered as Criminal Appeal No. 228 of 1979 on the ground of limitation, A petition under S. 5 of the Limitation Act was also filed along with the Criminal Appeal, but the grounds urged therein for condonation of delay did not appeal to the Sessions Judge as sufficient cause and, accordingly, he rejected it, and also the appeal as barred by time.

2. Mr. Palit, the learned counsel for the petitioner, urges two grounds. The first ground is that the cause of action for filing an appeal under Section 454 (1), Cr. P. C. accrued on 27-7 1979 when Criminal Misc. Case No.253 of 1979 filed in this Court for leave to appeal against the order of acquittal was dismissed. Computing the period of 30 days from that date the appeal was in time. The second ground is that as the petitioner had erroneously thought that an appeal under S. 454 (1), Cr.P.C. can be filed only after the final disposal of the leave application the delay caused by erroneous thinking based upon wrong legal advice should constitute sufficient cause.

3. To understand the first contention a few antecedent facts need be stated. The petitioner filed a complaint case (Case No. 1CC 224 of 1978) against the opposite parties alleging that the opposite parties had committed theft of a truck bearing No. ORU 9097 which the petitioner had obtained on hire purchase basis having been financed by the Cuttack Branch of Syndicate Bank. The registration of the truck was made in his name, road permit was also issued in his name and the vehicle also was insured in his name. The accused persons subsequently approached the complainant for purchasing the truck and, accordingly, on 14-5-75 an agreement was executed between the petitioner and opposite party No. 2 for sale of the truck. The consideration was fixed at Rs. 1,44,000.00 out of which Rs. 25,000.00 was to be paid initially and the balance amount of Rs. 1,19,000.00 was to be paid in 35 equal monthly instalments. On payment of Rs. 25,000.00 the truck was delivered to the opposite parties for plying. The opposite parties paid 20 instalments of Rs. 3.400.00 each and defaulted in paying the balance amount of Rs. 70,000.00 . So on 20-4-78 the petitioner took physical possession of the vehicle, but on 22-4-78 the accused persons came and removed the truck despite his protests. The defence plea was a total denial of the occurrence. The opposite parties further pleaded that they had purchased the truck by paying Rs. 25,000.00 initially and an amount of Rs. 1,14,800.00 subsequently to the petitioner towards the full price of the truck. The vehicle was all along in their custody till the same was seized by the police from them on 29-4-79.

4. The trial Court by its judgment dated 9-5-79 acquitted the opposite parties on finding that the allegation of removal of the truck by the accused persons from the complainants custody is not believable and that the evidence that the accused defaulted in paying Rs. 70,000.00 cannot be accepted. In the same judgment, after recording an order of acquittal, the trial Court proceeded to pass orders regarding disposal of the truck in the following words :-

".........The seized truck is to be returned to the accused, after the appeal period is over if no appeal is preferred."

5. Being aggrieved by the order of acquittal the petitioner . came to this Court for leave to appeal in Criminal Misc. Case No. 253 of 1979 which was dismissed on 27-7-1979. The appeal before the Sessions Judge under S. 454(1), Cr. P. C. was filed on 1-8-1979.

6. The first contention of Mr. Palit, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that since the appeal period is to be computed from 27-7-79 when the leave application was dismissed, the appeal to the Sessions Judge having been filed on 1-8-79 is in time. He argues that right to appeal accrues to the petitioner only