The appellate authority under Section 15(3) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, does not have the jurisdiction to remand the whole case to the Rent Controller for decision afresh.

S.S.SANDHAWALIA, J.

1. Whether the appellate authority under S.15(3) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 , has the jurisdiction to remand the whole case to the Rent Controller for decision afresh is the sole, though meaningful, question which falls for determination in these two civil revision petitions before us on a reference. Directly linked therewith is also the issue of the correctness of the view expressed first by Grover J., in Civil Revn. No. 641 of 1957 - Moti Ram V/s. Ram Sahai, decided on April 29, 1958 (Punj) and its categoric affirmance by the Division Bench in Krishan Lal Seth V/s. Shrimati Pritam Kumari, (1961) 63 Pun LR 865.

2. It is manifest that the aforesaid question is pristinely legal. Nevertheless the matrix of facts giving rise to the issue does call for notice. Raghunath Jalota petitioner instituted two separate applications for ejectment under the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act (hereinafter called the Act) - one against Labhu Ram and Ramesh Duggal respondents jointly and the other against Ramesh Duggal respondent alone with respect to the portions of a godown leased to them. Both these applications first came up before Mr. K.S. Kauldhar, the Rent Controller and he framed issues in each application and evidence was also recorded separately therein. It would appear that later the matter came up before his successor Shri S.S. Tiwana and apparently taking the view that the grounds of ejectment in the two applications were virtually the same except the ground of subletting which was an additional around in the main application he took up both the applications together and discussing the issues therein jointly disposed them of by an exhaustive judgement running into 22 typed pages on the 10th of March, 1975. Thereby he allowed both the ejectment applications and directed the ejectment of the respondents.

3. Aggrieved the respondents appealed to the appellate authority under the Rent Restriction Act being the District Judge, Kapurthala, who took the view that the disposal of the two cases, by a single judgement was against the provisions of the Civil P.C. and, therefore, set it aside. He remanded both the cases to the Rent Controller, purporting to act under Sec. 151, Civil P.C., for disposing them through separate judgements by confining himself to the material on the record of each case with the further direction that since evidence in both cases had already been separately led neither party would be allowed to produce any additional evidence.

4. The petitioner has come up by way of this revision petition primarily on the ground that the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to remand the whole case for re-decision and could only act within the confines of Section 15(3) and if necessary could have made further enquiry himself or direct such a further enquiry through the Controller. The matter first came up before S.P. Goyal J., who has expressed a veiled doubt about the correctness of Krishan Lal Seth s case (supra) in making the references.

5. Ere I inevitably come to the authorities relevant to the point it is refreshing to consider the matter on principle. The controversy must obviously revolve around the statutory provisions and these may be read at the very outset -

"15 Vesting of appellate authority on officers by State Government :-

(1)(a) The State Government may, by a general or special order, by notification confer on such officers and authorities as they think fit the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of this Act, in such area or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order.

(b) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may within fifteen days from the date of such order or such longer period as the appellate authority may allow for reasons to be recorded in writing, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction (in computing the period of fifteen days the time taken to obtain a certified copy of