PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
R.S.Narula, Bal Raj Tuli and Muni Lal Verma JJ.
Bikram Dass
Versus
Financial Commissioner, Revenue, Punjab, Chandigarh
Letter Patent Appeal No. 65 of 1971,
Decided On : MARCH 19, 1974
LETTERS PATENT APPEAL - CONDONATION OF DELAY - JURISDICTION - LIMITATION - REFILING OF APPEAL - INCOMPLETE APPEAL - MANDATORY PROVISIONS - VALIDITY OF APPEAL.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant filed a Letters Patent Appeal against the order of the Financial Commissioner, which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge. The appellant filed an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent, but it was returned by the Deputy Registrar for removing defects and to refile it within a week. The appeal was refiled after removing the defects, but no objection was taken by the Deputy Registrar to its having been refiled after more than a week allowed by him. The appeal was admitted by the Motion Bench without adverting to the question of limitation. When the appeal came up for hearing before the Division Bench, the respondents raised the objection that it was barred by time. The appellant moved an application for condonation of delay, if there was any, in presenting the appeal.
Finding of the Court:
1. The power to condone delay or extend time for filing an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court is not confined to the Bench admitting the appeal. Rule 4 of Chapter 1-A (a) of the Rules and Orders of this Court, Vol. V/s. takes away the jurisdiction of the Bench hearing the appeal or any Bench other than the Motion Bench to extend the time. 2. The delay in preferring the appeal is not deemed to have been impliedly condoned by the Motion Bench by admitting it to a hearing after the expiry of the period of limitation. 3. A Letters Patent Appeal, which has not been rejected under Order XLI, Rule 3 of the Code, can be dismissed as barred by time on the ground that though it was originally filed within time, it has been refiled along with spare paper-books beyond time. 4. The Registry entertaining an appeal which is refiled after the expiry of the period of limitation beyond the time allowed in the endorsement of return, but within forty days of the order of return if the appeal when originally filed was within time, has the effect of extending the time allowed by the Deputy Registrar in the first instance for amendment and refiling of the same up to the date when it was so entertained by him. 5. An appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent can be held to be incomplete or "no appeal in the eye of law" merely because it is not accompanied by the requisite three spare copies of the paper-book.
Issues: 1. Whether the power to condone delay or extend time for filing an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court is confined to the Bench admitting the appeal and Rule 4 of Chap. 1-A (a) of the Rules and orders of this Court, Vol. V/s. takes away the jurisdiction of the Bench hearing the appeal or any Bench other than the Motion Bench to extend the time? 2. Whether the delay in preferring the appeal is deemed to have been impliedly condoned by the Motion Bench by admitting it to a hearing after the expiry of the period of limitation? 3. Can a Letters Patent Appeal, which has not been rejected under Order XLI, Rule 3 of the Code, be dismissed as barred by time on the ground that though it was originally filed within time, it has been refiled along with spare paper-books beyond time? 4. What is the effect of the Registry entertaining an appeal which is refiled after the expiry of the period of limitation beyond the time allowed in the endorsement of return, but within forty days of the order of return if the appeal when originally filed was within time? 5. Can an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent be held to be incomplete or "no appeal in the eye of law" merely because it is not accompanied by the requisite three spare copies of the paper-book?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The power to condone delay or extend time for filing an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent is not confined to the Bench admitting the appeal. Rule 4 of Chapter 1-A (a) of the Rules and Orders of this Court, Vol. V/s. takes away the jurisdiction of the Bench hearing the appeal or any Bench other than the Motion Bench to extend the time. 2. The delay in preferring the appeal is not deemed to have been impliedly condoned by the Motion Bench by admitting it to a hearing after the expiry of the period of limitation. 3. A Letters Patent Appeal, which has not been rejected under Order XLI, Rule 3 of the Code, can be dismissed as barred by time on the ground that though it was originally filed within time, it has been refiled along with spare paper-books beyond time. 4. The Registry entertaining an appeal which is refiled after the expiry of the period of limitation beyond the time allowed in the endorsement of return, but within forty days of the order of return if the appeal when originally filed was within time, has the effect of extending the time allowed by the Deputy Registrar in the first instance for amendment and refiling of the same up to the date when it was so entertained by him. 5. An appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent can be held to be incomplete or "no appeal in the eye of law" merely because it is not accompanied by the requisite three spare copies of the paper-book.
Final Decision: The appeal was sent back to the Division Bench for final disposal in light of the observations made by the Full Bench. The Division Bench was also directed to decide the application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
MUNI LAL VERMA, J.
1. The appellant filed Civil Writ Petition No. 1146 of 1966, in this Court against the order of the Financial Commissioner, which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge on November 27, 1970. Against that judgment the appellant filed an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent on December 23, 1970. The Deputy Registrar raised certain objections, including that it was not accompanied by three sets of typed copies of documents as required by Rule 3 of Chapter 2-C of the High Court Rules and Orders, Vol. V, and ordered its return to the learned counsel for the appellant for removing the defects and to refile it within a week. The order for return was passed on December 23, 1970, but it has not been possible to ascertain as to on which date the learned counsel or his clerk took it back from the Court. However, after removing the defects pointed out by the Deputy Registrar, the appeal was refiled on January 30, 1971. No objection was then taken by the Deputy Registrar to its having been refiled after more than a week allowed by him : On February 24, 1971, the appeal was admitted by the Motion Bench without adverting to the question of limitation. On April 19, 1972, when the appeal came up for hearing before the Division Bench, the learned counsel for Dayal Singh, Harbhajan Singh and Harbans Singh, the contesting respondents, raised the objection that it was barred by time. Thereupon, the appellant moved an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay, if there was any, in presenting the appeal. The said application was resisted by Dayal Singh, Harbhajan Singh and Harbans Singh (hereinafter called the respondents). It was contended by the teamed counsel for the appellant that the appeal, when initially presented on December 23, 1970, was within time and even otherwise, if there was any delay in its presentation when it was refiled, the Motion Bench, while admitting the appeal, would be deemed to have condoned the same. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents argued that in the circumstances of the case, the appeal should be deemed to have been presented on January 30, 1971, and as it was then barred by time, it was only the Motion Bench which could, on good cause being shown, condone the delay. Reliance in that respect was placed by him on Rule 4 of Chapter 1-A (a) of the High Court Rules and Orders, Vol. V, and certain judgments of this Court as well as the High Courts of Delhi and Lahore. The Division Bench, while hearing the appeal on September 1, 1972, felt that several questions of law of great public importance and of daily occurrence were involved, which required determination by a larger Bench, particularly because there was difference of opinion amongst the learned Judges as disclosed by the judgments cited at the Bar. Consequently, the Division Bench formulated the following seven questions to be referred to a Full Bench for decision :-
(1) Whether the power to condone delay or extend time for filing an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent of this Court is confined to the Bench admitting the appeal and Rule 4 of Chap. 1-A (a) of the Rules and orders of this Court, Vol. V/s. takes away the jurisdiction of the Bench hearing the appeal or any Bench other than the Motion Bench to extend the time? In other words whether the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Janardhan Misra s case is correct of the view expressed by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of Matu Ram and others, and by the earlier Division Bench of this Court in Harbans Singh s case is sound?
(2) Whether the delay in preferring the appeal is deemed to have been impliedly condoned by the Motion Bench by admitting it to a hearing after the expiry of the period of limitation?
(3) Can an appeal be dismissed after admission on a ground on which it was liable to be rejected under Order XLI, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure?
(4) Whether a memor
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