The Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain claims for damage to property simplicitier under Section 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended in 1969. The word "injury" in Section 110-A(1) includes injury to property.

S.P.GOYAL, J.

1. This appeal from the order of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Hissar (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal), dated 5.10.1971, raises an interesting point of law as to whether a compensation claim for damage to property simplicitier can be entertained and adjudicated upon by the Tribunal u/s. 110(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 .

2. The appellant-Haryana State preferred a claim application before the Tribunal for an amount of Rs. 3,000.00 by way of compensation on the allegations that five buffaloes of the progeny Testing Farm, Hissar, owned by the State, were killed by rash and negligent driving of Truck No. HRH-7467 on 17.09.1970 by Duli Chand driver.

3. The claim was contested by the respondents who also raised a preliminary objection that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the same. Relying on Smt. Jaswant Kaur V/s. Ratti Ram, 1970 72 PunLR 932, the Tribunal upheld the plea of the respondents and dismissed the petition. The correctness of this order is under challenge in this appeal.

4. Mr. V. P. Gandhi, the learned counsel for the respondents, does not dispute that the proposition laid down in Smt. Jaswant Kaurs case (supra) does not hold the field any more because of the amendment brought about in S. 110 by the Amending Act No. 56 of 1969. He, however, sought to sustain the order of the Tribunal on another ground that no claim application is competent by a third person who has not received any bodily injury. To substantiate this argument, the learned counsel referred to the provisions of S. 110-A (1) and contended that under sub-cl. (a) which alone could possibly be invoked in the present case, the claim application is competent only by the person who has sustained bodily injury. The argument of the learned counsel seems to be that the word "injury" in sub-cl. (a) means only the bodily injury and that unless a person making a claim for damage to property has also received bodily injury in the accident, no such cliam would be maintainable. In support of his contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on Farsubhai Altapbhai Saiyed V/s. Dullabhbhai Bhagabhai Patel, AIR 1972 Guj 244 and B. S. Nat V/s. Bachan Singh, AIR 1971 Punj 144 (supra). In Farsubhai s case (supra) the provisions of Sec. 110-A (1) were interpreted prior to the amendment of S. 110 in the year 1969. On a combined reading of Ss. 110 (1) and 110-A (1), it was held that application before the Tribunal could be made only by a person who has sustained bodily injury and that the person who has suffered damage to his property as a result of the accident was not given the right to make such application. Prior to the amendment in the year 1969, the Tribunal had the jurisdiction only to adjudicate claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to the persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles and it was only by the Amending Act No. 56 of 1969 that the claims respecting damage to the property of a third party were made triable by the Tribunal. So this decision which was rendered prior to this amendment on the combined reading of S. 110 (1) and S. 110-A (1) is not of much help in the interpretation of the provisions of Cl. (1) of S. 110-A. So far as B. S. Nath s case (supra) is concerned, what was relied upon by the learned counsel were some obiter dicta observations of C. G. Suri, J. according to which some corresponding amendments consequential to the changes made in S. 110 should have been made in the clauses of Section 110-A (1) which are supposed to give an exhaustive list of the categories of persons who can file application under the Act. These observations by the learned Judge can hardly be said to contain any expression of opinion on the interpretation of the provisions of Section 110-A (1) and, therefore, are also of no help.

5. It was next contended that though the provisions of Sec. 110 (1) were amended so as to authorise the Tribunal to decide claims respecting