Sanction for prosecution under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is necessary when a public servant is charged with criminal breach of trust if the acts complained of are integrally connected with the duties attaching to the office.

S.S.SIDHU, J.

1. The State of Haryana has filed this appeal against the judgment dated 1st February, 1973, of the Court of the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Ambala (Shri P. P. Chhabra), by which it acquitted Iqbal Singh respondent of his charge under S. 409, Indian Penal Code, because it was found that it was necessary for the prosecution to obtain sanction of the Central Government to prosecute Iqbal Singh and that the same had not been obtained before launching prosecution against him in the Court.

2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that Iqbal Singh respondent was working as Foreman-cum-Supervisor, Rural Industry Development Central, at Pinjore. He absented aimself from duty from 12th August, 1967, onwards and took away some Government money with him. The District Industries Officer made a complaint to the Superintendent of Police Ambala, alleging that Iqbal Singh had embezzled the Government money. He had proceeded on medical leave for four days with effect from 26th July, 1967. He then got his leave extended to 11th August, 1967. After that, neither any application for extension of leave was received from him nor did he report himself for duty. He was required to appear before the Industries Officer, Ambala, and hand over the money by 20th August, 1967, but he failed to do so and instead sent a letter stating that he would appear before that officer on 23rd August, 1967. Even on the aforesaid date, he failed to turn up before that officer. The complaint containing the above allegations was made against him to the Superintendent of Police, as stated above. The amounts which were allegedly embezzled by him, as mentioned in the complaint, were as under:-

(1) Rs. 1445.85 - This amount he had shown in the cash book to have been spent for purchase of electric goods and installation thereof in the office. In fact he had not utilised that money for that purpose.

(2) Rs. 666.31-This amount had remained with the accused as balance.

(3) Rs. 1008.33-This amount he had shown in the cash-book to have been paid to the concerned payee but he had not actually done so.

(4) Rs. 533.40-This amount had remained with him as miscellaneous amount. The police, after investigation, arrested the accused and challaned him in the Court for his trial under S. 409, Indian Penal Code.

3. The trial Court charged the accused under S. 409, Indian Penal Code, The accused pleaded not guilty to his charge and claimed trial.

4. 8 witnesses were examined by the prosecution in support of the charge framed against the accused. The accused in his statement recorded under S. 342, Cr. P. C. after the close of the prosecution evidence, denied the prosecution allegations and pleaded innocence. He admitted that he was entrusted with an amount of Rs. 3,096.99 during the period between 1-11-1966 and 23-8-1967 but added that he was innocent and that he had fallen ill and on account of that he could not attend his office. It was further pleaded by him that the whole of the amount was then paid hack by him to the department concerned The learned trial Magistrate ultimately acquitted Igbal Singh respondent vide his judgment dated 1st February, 1973, as already stated above.

5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have fully appreciated the arguments addressed before us by them. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that no sanction for prosecution of a public servant, as contemplated by the provisions of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, is necessary, when that public servant is to be prosecuted for the commission of the offence of criminal breach of trust and, therefore, in the present case, the learned trial Magistrate, wrongly acquitted Iqbal Singh respondent for want of sanction of the Central Government to prosecute him under S. 409, Indian Penal Code, vide the impugned order dated 1st February, 1973, and, as such the said order is liable to be quashed. He, in support of his contention, has cited Om