A suit for declaration that a registered sale deed is void or voidable is in substance a suit for cancellation of the sale deed and the plaintiff is liable to pay ad valorem court fee.

1. The challenge in this revision petition is to the order dated 5-4-1997 passed by the learned Sub-Judge Ist Class, Chandigarh, dismissing the application of the defendant praying for rejection of the plaint under the provisions of Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the reasons stating therein. In order to effectively determine the controversy arising in this revision, it is necessary to refer to the basic facts giving rise to this petition. The plaintiff had filed a suit for declaration to the effect that the registered sale deed dated 26-3-1991 was forged, fabricated and fake document and is not enforceable in respect of the property in question i.e. house No. 86, Sector 18-A, Chandigarh. This suit was contested by the present petitioner. The submissions raised before the trial Court was that the suit as framed was hit by the provisions of Sec. 34 of the Specific Relief Act as no relief for declaration could be claimed without praying for a consequential relief therefrom. The main plank of the argument on behalf of the petitioner is that the present suit is not one for declaration simplicitor but in fact and substantively is a suit for cancellation of a registered sale deed, as such, the plaintiff in the suit ought to have paid Court fee on the valuation reflected in the said document and the fixed Court fee of Rs. 20/- was not payable. On this ground it is stated that the plaint of the plaintiff is liable to be rejected and suit be dismissed. The learned trial Court after some discussions rejected the application. The reasoning given by the learned trial Court is that the plaintiff as alleges himself to be an absolute owner of the property in question and the ownership has not been challenged by the defendant and as such the suit was for simplicitor declaration on which the fixed Court fee could be paid.

2. As is evident from the above facts and circumstances, the basic controversy relates to the liability of the plaintiff to pay the appropriate Court fee in accordance with law. The suit is one for declaration which seeks a decree for declaring that a document is forged, fabricated and in- effective. As such the relief in law cannot be granted unless the Court hold that the document is liable to be cancelled. Cancellation of the document in any event would be the basic and main relief which the Court would have to grant even if the version stated by the plaintiff is established as pleaded. It is a settled principle of law that it is not the title or wording of the prayer which would determine the Court fee payable on the relief claimed but it is the substance and manner of the plaint read together that would finally determine such an issue. The sale deed dated 26-3-1991 is a registered document. According to the defendant the title of the property is already passed to him by virtue of the registered sale deed and it is only the cancellation thereof which could divest them in law of the right accruing therefrom. The reasoning given by the learned trial Court does not appear to be well founded in view of the settled judicial principles regulating the controversy in issue. At this stage, it may be appropriate to make a reference to the judgment of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the case of Shamsher Singh V/s. Rajinder Prashad, AIR 1973 SC 2384. The relevant portions of which read as under (at page 2386) :-

"The Court in deciding the question of Court-fee should look into the allegations in the plaint to see what is the substantive relief that is asked for. Mere astuteness in drafting the plaint will not be allowed to stand in the way of the Court looking at the substance of the relief asked for.xx xx xx(at page 2387).Consequently when the plaintiffs sued for a declaration that the decree obtained by the appellant against their father was not binding on them they were really asking either for setting aside the decree or for the consequential relief of injunction restraining the decree holder from executi