An acknowledgment of liability in writing signed by one of the co-mortgagees constitutes a valid acknowledgment of liability under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, extending the limitation period.

N.K.Agrawal, J.

1. This a second appeal by the plaintiffs. A civil suit was filed by three brothers namely, Tara Singh, Sital Singh and Sardara Singh before Sub Judge, Second Class, Kharar in the year 1975 for declaration to the effect that they were the owners in possession of 1/2 of the land situated in village Ghoga Kheri, Tehsil Sirhind, now Kharar. The declaration was sought on the ground that the suit land had been mortgaged by defendant No. 1. Pritam Singh, with the father of the plaintiffs for Rs. 1,600/- in the year 1948. Right to redeem the mortgage expired after 30 years and, therefore, declaration to that effect was sought in the said civil Suit. The land in question was mortgaged by Pritam Singh (defendant No. 1) with Mahan Singh (father of the plaintiffs) under a marriage deed on may 18, 1943. Mutation No. 366 was sanctioned on June 9, 1943. After the death of the original mortgagee, Mahan Singh, the plaintiffs being the sons of Mahan Singh, stepped into the shoes of their father and claimed in the civil suit that right to redeem the mortgage had extinguished after the expiry of 30 years and they had become the owners of the land.

2. Defendant No. 1 in his written statement before the trial Court, took the plea that 1/2 of the mortgaged land was released by the mortgagees in the year 1968 without receiving any money. The entire mortgage amount (Rs. 1,600/-) was made a charge oil the remaining 1/2 land. A report (No. 319) was recorded by Patwari in Roznamcha on May 11, 1968. Thus, the mortgagees admitted the existence of mortgage of the suit land in the year 1968, thereby extending the period of limitation.

3. The learned Sub Judge framed issues and, after trial, dismissed the plaintiffs plea that they had become the owners after the expiry of the period of limitation. The trial Court held that, by virtue of the acknowledgement made in the year 1968, there was an extension in the period of limitation and, therefore, the right of redemption did not extinguish as claimed by the plaintiffs.

4. The plaintiffs went in appeal before the Additional District Judge, Roop Nagar but failed. The learned appellate Court, by judgment dated January 5, 1980, up-held the view taken by the learned trial Court that the period of limitation stood extended on the ground of acknowledgment.

5. Mr. Mahavir Ahlawat, learned counsel for the appellants-plaintiff, has argued that the Roznamcha report recorded by the Patwari on May 11,1968 was not a valid acknowledgment inasmuch as it was neither recorded in the presence of the co-mortgagees (Tara Singh and Sital Singh) nor the signature of Tara Singh, who was said to be present before the Patwari, was obtained on the Roznamcha report. It is claimed that Sardara Singh alone had signed the report and it did not amount to an acknowledgment by all the mortgagees. Sardara Singh alone had no authority to make an acknowledgment of the mortgage. It is also explained that no entry was made in Khasra Girdawari in pursuance of the report.

6. Reliance has been placed on a full Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Valliamma Champaka v. Sivathanu Pillai and Ors., A.I.R. 1964 Madras 269, in support of the proposition that a valid acknowledgment for the purposes of limitation should be in respect of a subsisting liability. Where the mortgagee executing the release deed referred only to his past and extinguished right as a mortgage, acknowledging the payment of the mortgage money, the very purpose of the release deed was to say the mortgage right had been extinguished by payment and that the mortgagee had no further rights. That cannot obviously constitute an acknowledgment of a subsisting liability. A mere recital of past liability accompanied by a statement as to its discharge cannot be construed as an acknowledgment of liability. Shri Ahlawat has argued on the strength of the said decision that a mere release deed was not sufficient to constitute a valid acknowledgment unless it fulfilled th