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1966 Supreme(SC) 186

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K. SUBBA RAO, C.J.I. AND J.M. SHELAT, J.
Tilak Ram and others, Appellants
Versus
Nathu and others, Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 36 of 1965, D/-5-9-1966.
Advocates appeared
Mr. B. C. Misra, Senior Advocate, (Mr. M. V. Goswami Advocate, with him), for Appellants: Mr V. K. Krishna Menon, Senior Advocate (Mr. Vidya Sagar Nayyar, Advocate. with him), (for No. 3) and M/s. Madan Bhatia, and D. Goburdhun Advocates (for Nos. 1 to 4), Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon, Senior Advocate, (M/s. Madan Bhatia, D. P. Singh, S. C. Agarwala and D. Goburdhun, Advocates, with him) (for Nos. 5(a), 5(b), and 6 to 10), for Respondents.

Advocates:
B.C.MISHRA, D.GOVERDHAN CHARY, D.P.Singh, M.V.GOSWAMY, MADAN BHATIA, S.C.AGRAWAL, V.K.Krishna Menon, VIDYA SAGAR NAYYAR

A mere admission of a jural relationship between a mortgagor and mortgagee does not constitute an acknowledgment of liability under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1908, unless the statement is made with the intention of admitting a subsisting liability to be redeemed.

Headnote:(A) Limitation Act, 1908 - Section 19 - Acknowledgment of liability - Redemption of mortgage - Whether a mere admission of jural relationship between mortgagor and mortgagee constitutes an acknowledgment of liability to extend the limitation period - A statement to fall within Section 19 must be a conscious and deliberate admission of the right of the mortgagor to redeem and the corresponding liability of the maker of the statement to be redeemed (Paras 4, 9) - An admission of jural relationship must be made with the intention of admitting such relationship subsisting at the time the statement was made; such intention can be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission but cannot be imposed by an involved or far-fetched process of reasoning (Paras 9, 10).

Facts of the case:
Predecessors of the parties entered into several usufructuary mortgages. The mortgage rights were subsequently sub-mortgaged and sold. The appellants' predecessors acquired the equity of redemption for a partial share. After a period of over sixty years, the appellants filed a suit for redemption and possession. The respondents contended that the suit was barred by limitation. The appellants relied on four documents, including a sale deed and pleadings in previous suits, claiming they constituted acknowledgments of the subsisting mortgage under the law of limitation.

Findings of Court:
The statements in the relied-upon documents were made for the purpose of describing rights being transferred or tracing title, rather than admitting a subsisting liability to be redeemed. One document specifically denied the right to redeem. None of the statements indicated an intention to acknowledge the jural relationship as a subsisting liability at the date of the statement.

Issues: Whether the mere admission of a jural relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee in various documents is sufficient to constitute an acknowledgment of liability under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1908, thereby extending the limitation period for redemption.

Ratio Decidendi: For a statement to constitute an acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, it must relate to a subsisting liability. A mere admission of jural relationship is insufficient unless it is made with the intention of admitting that the relationship subsists at the time of the statement. Such intention must be reasonably inferable from the words and circumstances and cannot be arrived at through far-fetched reasoning.

Result: Appeal dismissed.

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • property law
    • mortgages
      • redemption
        • limitation (Para 1, 3, 4, 12)
  • practice and procedure
    • limitation act
      • acknowledgment of liability (Para 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11)

Table of Contents

1. Suit for redemption of mortgaged lands — Plea of limitation — Reliance on documents as acknowledgments of liability under Section 19, Limitation Act, 1908. (Para 1 , 2 , 3 )

2. Whether a mere admission of jural relationship between mortgagor and mortgagee constitutes an acknowledgment of liability to be redeemed under Section 19, Limitation Act, 1908. (Para 4 , 5 )

3. Acknowledgment must relate to a subsisting liability where the intention to admit the jural relationship is reasonably inferable from the words and surrounding circumstances. (Para 7 , 8 , 9 , 10 , 11 )

4. Mere admission of jural relationship is insufficient for acknowledgment under Section 19 unless the intention to admit a subsisting liability is reasonably inferable from the context. (Para 9 , 10 )

5. Appeal dismissed — Suit held barred by limitation as the relied-upon statements did not constitute valid acknowledgments. (Para 12 , 13 )

6. What are the essential requirements for a valid acknowledgment under Section 19 of the Limitation Act, 1908?

A valid acknowledgment requires an admission of liability regarding a property or right, made in writing and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, before the expiration of the prescribed limitation period. (Para 6 , 7 )

7. Does a mere admission of the jural relationship between a mortgagor and mortgagee constitute an acknowledgment of liability?

No. A statement must relate to a subsisting liability, and the intention to admit the jural relationship must be reasonably inferable from the words used and the surrounding circumstances, rather than through far-fetched reasoning. (Para 9 , 10 )

8. How should courts interpret statements relied upon as acknowledgments under the Limitation Act?

Courts generally lean toward a liberal construction; however, they cannot infer an admission where none was made or where the statement was clearly made without intending to admit the existence of a jural relationship. (Para 9 )

Judgment

SHELAT, J. : The predecessors of one Teja Hazari were the owners of lands admeasuring 15S bighas situate in the village Naraina near Delhi. Between August 1861 and October 1869 they executed seven usufructuary mortgages in favour of one Dharamdas to secure repayment of an aggregate sum of Rs. 1,290 advanced by him. Dharamdas died leaving him surviving his son Parmeshwardas. The said Parmeshwardas sub-mortgaged the suit lands in favour of one Badam, Chunder and Ganga Sahai, the ancestors of the appellants for Rs. 650 by mortgage-deeds, dated February 21, 1902 and April 8, 1902. Thereafter he sold his mortgage rights to Ganga Sahai and Hira Singh, the predecessors in title of the respondents for Rs. 1,290. By a deed of sale dated March 9, 1903 the said Teja sold equity of redemption in his 3/4th sharein the said mortgaged lands for Rs. 1,900 in favour of Badam Jaishi, Chunder Bapal, Kalu Harnam and Badam Gulab, the predecessors-in-title of the appellants. As a result of these transactions the position in 1903 was that the predecessors-in-title of the respondents stood in the position of mortgagors subject to the said sub-mortgage and the predecessors-in-title of the appellants stood in the position of mortgagors of the said lands to the extent of the 3/4th share therein and the rest of the 1/4th share therein remained with the said Teja. On April 14, 1903 the said Hira Singh and Ganga Sahai, the predecessors-in-title of the respondents filed a suit being Suit No. 31 of 1903 against the said Badam and others for redemption and for possession of the said lands. The said Badam, Teja and others, the predecessors-in-title of the appellants, thereupon brought a suit being Suit No. 50 of 1903 for redemption against the said Hira Singh and others on payment of Rs. 856 and odd. The Trial Judge by his judgment, dated August 31, 1903 decreed Suit No. 31 of 1903 and dismissed Suit No. 50 of 1903. In appeal, however, the appellate Court reversed the said judgment and decree and passed a decree for redemption and possession on payment of Rs. 8,839-13-0 in favour of the predecessors-in-title of the appellants and the said Teja and against the predecessors-in-title of the respondents. The appellants predecessors-in-title, however, failed to redeem. Consequently the suit lands continued to remain in possession of the respondents predecessors-in-title. The said Teja migrated to Pakistan in 1947 whereupon his 1/4th share in the said lands vested in the Custodian of Evacuee Property. On December 4, 1951, the appellants applied for redemption of their 3/4th share in the said lands under the Punjab Redemption of Mortgages Act, II of 1913 before the Additional Collector, Delhi, who, however, referred the parties to a civil Court. On May 15, 1954 the appellants filed the present suit for a declaration that the said seven mortgages still subsisted and for redemption and possession of their 3/4th share in the suit lands. In answer to that suit the respondents pleaded that as sixty years had already expired since the dates of the said mortgages the suit was barred by limitation and the appellants were not entitled to redeem the said lands. The appellants relied on four statements for the purpose of saving limitation which they alleged were acknowledgments within the meaning of S. 19 of the Limitation Act, IX of 1908. These statements were in the following documents:-

1. The written statement, Ex. P. 14, in Suit No. 50 of 1903 which contained a statement that Parmeshwardas held the said lands as the mortgagee thereof under the said seven mortgages.

2. The plaint, Ex. P. 15, in Suit No. 31 of 1903 wherein reference was made of Parmeshwardas having executed the said sub-mortgage.

3. Sale-deed, Ex. X, executed by Parmeshwardas thereby selling his mortgage rights in favour of the predecessors-in-title of the respondents.

4. Deed of sub-mortgage Ex. E executed by Parmeshwardas in 1902.

2. In the last document the statement relied on was with regard to only t


















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