1997 Supreme(P&H) 963
PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT
S.C.Malte, J.
Roop Narain Shukla
Versus
Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal
Civil Writ Petition No. 3187 of 1982,
Decided On : MAY 30, 1997
Important Points
Subject
Industrial Disputes - RETrenchment
Act Referred
Headnote
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT - RETRENCHMENT - TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT - STANDING ORDERS - COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 25-F - RELIEF TO WORKMAN - DISCRETION OF COURT - REINSTATEMENT WITH BACKWAGES - EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES - COMPENSATION IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner, an employee of the respondent company, was terminated from employment on the ground of absence from duty for a period of 12 days, as per the Certified Standing Orders of the factory. The petitioner challenged the termination, contending that it amounted to retrenchment and that the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act were not complied with. The Industrial Court found that the petitioner was absent from duty and that the termination was in accordance with the Standing Orders.
Finding of the Court:
The High Court held that the termination of employment amounted to retrenchment and that the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act were not complied with. However, considering the long delay in filing the writ petition, the petitioner's admission of earning equivalent wages through petty business, and the technological changes that may have occurred in the intervening period, the Court found that reinstatement would not be appropriate. Instead, the Court awarded compensation of Rs. 50,000 to the petitioner in lieu of past dues and the claim of reinstatement.
Issues: 1. Whether the termination of employment amounted to retrenchment? 2. Whether the provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act were complied with? 3. What relief should be granted to the petitioner?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that termination of employment on the ground of absence from duty for a specific period, as per the Certified Standing Orders, would be retrenchment in terms of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 2. The Court held that mere intimation to the workman that he should collect his dues from the office on any working day is not enough compliance with the provisions of Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 3. The Court held that in cases of wrongful termination of employment, reinstatement with full back wages is the general rule, but there may be exceptional circumstances that warrant a different relief. In this case, considering the long delay, the petitioner's admission of earning equivalent wages, and the technological changes, the Court found that compensation in lieu of reinstatement was appropriate.
Final Decision: The Court awarded compensation of Rs. 50,000 to the petitioner in lieu of past dues and the claim of reinstatement.
S. C. Malte, J.
1. The petitioner was employed with respondent No.2. At the relevant time, he was performing a job of inspection and testing of hydraulic pump. He was drawing wages at the rate of Rs.10.69 per day. The employment of the petitioner came to be terminated by notice dated September 15, 1976 on the ground that he had absented from duty with effect from September 3, 1976 to September 15, 1976 without any intimation to office. The termination of employment was on the ground that the petitioner has thus left his employment of his own accord and his name was struck off from the rolls, as per Clause 27 (1) of the Certified Standing Order of the factory. By the same notice, the petitioner was advised to collect all the legal dues from the accounts department of the factory on any working day. The petitioner made a grievance regarding his termination. The petitioner raised an industrial dispute, which eventually came to be reffered for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal, Faridabad.
2. Before the Industrial Tribunal, the petitioner contended that on August 1, 1976 while he was on duty the Plant Manager abused him on the ground out of six pumps inspected by the petitioner, four were rejected and only two were passed and thus he has shown total inefficiency in his performance. Thereafter, from August 3, 1976, the petitioner was made to sit at the gate of the factory, petitioner further claims that from August 6, 1976 to August 31, 1976 he obtained leave. On August 14, 1976 when he arrived at the factory he was not allowed to enter the gate of the factory. The petitioner claims that on September 14, 1976 he had made a representation to the Manager (Personnel) of the factory to allow him to work, but that effort went in vain. He claims that on Septemeber 16, 1976 he had obtained a gate pass to leave the factory early as he was not keeping good health. According to him he was willing to attend the work but was thus prevented. Thus, he claims that he has not absented himself from duty. The further contention was that the termination of the employment of the petitioner amounted to retrenchment and, therefore, it was necessary to comply with the provisions of Sec.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. Since that compliance was not made, the termination of employment was illegal.
3. The Management (respondent No.2) contended that from September 3, 1976 to September 15, 1976 the petitioner absented from duty without obtaining proper leave and thus exposed himself to the consequences as per the Certified Standing Order of the factory, which enabled the management to terminate his employment on the ground of absence for a span of period mentioned in the Standing Order.
4. Regarding the compliance of Sec.25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was submitted that since the termination of employment was in terms of the Standing Orders the provisions of Sec.25-F were not attracted. Further, it was submitted that the petitioner was offered the dues as per notice of termination of employment.
5. Before the Industrial Court, elaborate evidence was led in support of rival contentions On appreciation of the evidence, the Industrial Court arrived at the specific finding that the petitioner was absent from duty from September 3, 1976 to September 15, 1976, and his employment was rightly terminated in terms of Standing Orders. He further observed that since the termination was as a result of absence of the petitioner, and as per Standing Orders, he was not entitled to any relief. Against that order, dated September 13, 1976, the present writ petition was filed.
6. In this Court it was submitted that since the name of the petitioner was struck off it was a case of retrenchment and since it was not done by following the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was void ab initio, and deserves to be set aside, and the petitioner should be reinstated in service with full wages, in response to that, on behalf of respondent No.2 it was s