A landowner has no right to claim an opportunity of hearing by the State Government before exercising the power under the proviso to Section 44-A of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 to extend the period for execution of a development scheme.

JUDGMENT

G.R. Majithia, J.

This judgment disposes of Civil Writ Petitions No. 2153, 1375, 1821 and 1791 of 1986 since common question of law and fact is Involved therein,

2. I have all added to the facts from the pleadings in C. W. P. No. 2153 of 1986 for appreciation of the question of law arising for determination :-

3. Town Improvement Trust, Hansi (for brevity, the Trust) framed a Development Scheme u/s 24 read with Section 28(2) of the Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 (for short, the Act) in respect of the disputed land. Notification dated April 11, 1972 u/s 36 the Act was published in the Haryana Government Gazette dated May 30, 1972. It was dropped for some technical defects therein. A fresh notification under. Section 36 of the Act was published in the Haryana Government Gazette dated December 24, 1974. The petitioners filed against the proposed acquisition. These were heard and disposed of after affording personal opportunity of hearing to the petitioners The scheme was submitted to the State Government for approval The same was sanctioned and a notification under sub-section (1) of Section 42 of the Act was published in the Haryana Government Gazette dated October 19, 1976. Notices u/s 9 of the Land Acquisition Act were issued on December 7,1976, but no action was taken pursuant thereto. The scheme was not implemented within the prescribed period of five years. The State Government, in exercise of the powers conferred by the proviso to Section 44 A of the Act extended the period for execution of the scheme from September 27, 1981 to September 26, 1984 vide notification dated July 7, 1981. By another notification dated August 1, 1983, the period for execution of the scheme was extended from September 27, 1983 to September 26, 1986 Challenge to notifications extending the period for execution of the scheme has been made on the ground that extensions were granted arbitrarily without application of mind; no reasons were given for extending the period for execution of the scheme. No opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioners before granting extension The validity of the award rendered by the Land Acquisition Collector was also challenged.

4. Separate written statements have been filed on behalf of the respondents.

5. Respondent No. 1 in the written statement stated that the Land Acquisition Collector rendered the award dated March 6, 1986 fixing compensation for the acquired land at the rate of Rs. 75/- per square yard. Additional compensation had also been granted for the super structure. The landowner-claimants dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Collector filed references u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for enhancement of compensation to the Tribunal. The actual physical possession of the land acquired was taken by respondent No. 2 on March 16, 1986. The scheme could be implemented only after taking over possession of the land acquired for the development scheme The petitioners intentionally delayed the proceedings on one protext or the other. Extensions for execution of the scheme under the proviso to Section 44 A of the Act were rightly granted and the action of the State Government is legal and valid.

6. Identical pleas were taken by respondent No. 2 in the written statement.

7. The constitution validity of Section 44 A of the Act and the notifications issued from time to time under the proviso to the said section granting extensions in time for the execution of the scheme came up for consideration in this Court in L.P.A. 394 of 1983 (Municipal Committee, Bhiwani v. Munshi Ram etc. 1989 96 P.L.R. 202 after the case was remanded by the apex Court in Civil Appeals No. 10590-99 of 3983 with the following directions :-

"We have heard the learned counsel for the parties in all these appeals. We do not agree with the decisions of the High Court that the schemes involved in these cases were liable to be set aside on the basis of the reasons given by the Full Bench of the High