The validity of a statute does not depend solely on the use of the words "public purpose" in the statute. If the provisions of the statute make it clear that its sole object is to achieve a public purpose, the statute will be valid even if the words "public purpose" are not explicitly used.

Khosla, J.

1. This matter has been referred to us by Dulat J. on account of the importance of the question involved. The matter came before him in the original instance as a petition for writ on behalf of ten persons under Article 226 of the Constitution.

2. The petitioners challenge the action of Government in seeking to obtain possession of 3,400 bighas of their land in village Lalain Pangala, District Karnal, under the provisions of the East Punjab Utilization of Lands Act, 1949 (East Punjab Act No. 38 of 1949). Two points were raised before us by Mr. Tek Chand who appeared on behalf of the petitioners. He contended in the first place that the provisions of the Act which empowered the Collector to take possession of land under Section 3 were ultra vires. In the second place, he argued that the notice required by Section 3 had not been given to the petitioners and that therefore the subsequent steps taken by the Collector to obtain possession of their land were unwarranted by law and illegal.

3. I shall deal first with the question of the vires of the Act. The contention of Mr. Tek Chand is that the expressed purpose of the Act is not public & that therefore inasmuch as it seeks to deprive private individuals of their property it is against the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution. He contended that nowhere in the Act was the expression "public purpose" used and even the Collector in the notices which he issued to two of the petitioners did not use this expression. (It was found on examination that two of the petitioners namely Nandu No. 2 and Abba No. 3 had in fact been served with notices under Section 3 although in the petition it is stated that none of the ten petitioners had been given the necessary notice).

4. Now, it is not necessary for the statute to say in explicit terms that the purpose for which private property is being acquired or requisitioned is a public purpose as long as the provisions of the Act make this clear. If a reading of the Act makes it manifest that the sole object of enacting it was to achieve a public purpose, then even though the words "public purpose" are not used in the Act, the Act will be within the competence of the Legislature and will not be repugnant to the Constitution. In the present case we find that the object of the Act is to utilise lands which are lying fallow so that more food and grains can be grown. The heading of the Act says, "An Act to provide for the utilization of lands in East Punjab" Section 3 provides that if any land has been lying uncultivated for six or more harvests then the Collector may alter serving a notice upon the owner take possession of it with the object of giving it on lease to some other suitable person. The lease may be given under Section 5 and Section 4 provides for the payment of compensation to the "original owner. Section 8 deals with the failure of the tenant or the second occupier to grow food or fodder crops.

5. It is therefore clear that the Act was framed with the object of providing more food for the people. It authorised the Collector to take suitable steps for the cultivation or lands which were lying fallow owing to the neglect of the owners. The Collector could take possession of land which had not been cultivated for six harvests but he could only use the land for giving it to someone who would grow crops on it, and if this someone failed to do so he could be penalized for it. It will not be denied that to grow more food is a public purpose, and that having regard to the economy of the country it is eminently desirable that some such power should be given to the appropriate authority so that land which can provide food does not remain unused.

6. Mr. Tek Chand has, however, contended that the words "public purpose" should have been mentioned in the Act itself and he relied on a decision of this Court in -- Pt. Shyam Krishen V/s. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 Punj 70 (A). In this case a Division Bench of this Court considered t