IMPORTANT POINT
Divorce by mutual Consent—Court is competent to waive off the statutory period in the interest of justice keeping in view the special circumstances of each case.

Vinod K. Sharma, J.:- The petitioners i.e. husband and wife have filed this joint revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to challenge the order dated August 8, 2007 passed by the learned District Judge, Faridabad declining their request for waiving the six months’ period of waiting under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short the ‘Act’).

2. The relief for waiving off six months’ period was sought on the plea that the both the petitioners are Doctors by profession and that petitioner N o.1 had filed a petition under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act against petitioner No.2 for dissolution of marriage on August 11,2006 and the same was withdrawn. During this period, there was civil litigation between the parties with respect to the property at Faridabad. Another suit was filed in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Gurgaon, whereas petitioner No.2 had filed a criminal complaint under the provisions of The Protection of Woman from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. It was claimed that in the wake of multi-prolonged litigation pending inter se parties, it would be in the interest of justice, as well as in the interest of both the parties that their marriage be dissolved by mutual consent. It was also the case set up that petitioner No.2 has been adequately compensated.

3. It is worth noticing here that petitioner No.1– Dr. Arun Gupta is aged 51 years and has qualification of M.B.B.S. and M.D., whereas petitioner No.2 is aged 47 years. She also possesses a degree of M.B.B.S. and is Doctor by profession. Thus, it would be seen that both the parties are mature and are capable to watch their interest. Admittedly, there was no coercion, intimidation or undue influence and keeping in view of prolonged litigation between the parties, and as per the stands taken by them, it was proved on record that there was no possibility of reconciliation.

4. Petitioner No.1 has already deposited a sum of Rs. 40,00,000/- (Rs. Forty lacs) towards payment of full and final settlement of claims of petitioner No.2 and the said amount is lying in the Court.

5. This Court in the case of Amarjit Kaur Vs. Bhupinder Singh, 2007 (1) HLR 461 was pleased to lay down as under:-

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Section 13-B(2)- Divorce- Mutual Consent- Marriage between the parties was performed on 9-4-2000 and the parties till date have not reconciled themselves and the marriage has been totally broken down- There is no possibility of reconciliation – Keeping in view the age of the parties, the continuation of a sterile marriage would have deleterious effect on the prospects of re-marriage of the parties – Thus it was a case, where the trial Court could have waived off the period of six months so as to enable the parties to settle independently.

6. The learned District Judge, while noticing the judgment referred to above, has not agreed with the view expressed therein in view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Charanjit Singh Mann Vs. Neelam Mann, (2006-2) PLR 851. In para 11 of the said judgment, the Division Bench of this Court has been pleased to lay down as under:-

“However, irrespective of existence of the above stated grounds, sub-section (2) of Section 13-B does not permit the Court to dissolve a marriage by mutual consent not earlier than six months after the date of presentation of the petition or later than the expiry of 18 months after such presentation. The legislature, in its wisdom, has consciously provided the minimum and maximum waiting period during which alone a decree for divorce by mutual consent can be passed. The apparent object behind providing this period is to allow time to the spouses to reconsider their decision and finally make up their mind. It also enables the court to satisfy itself that the ‘consent’ is free from any extraneous influence and is also not tainted with any ‘collusion’ between the parties.”

7. However, it may be noticed that the finding recorded by the Division Bench was