The main legal point established in the judgment is the interpretation and applicability of the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, specifically Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28, and the court's power to amend any defect or error in the proceeding for determining the real question or issue.

V.K. Bali, J. - By this common order, we propose to decide five connected Letters Patent Appeals bearing Nos. 543 to 545, 1601 and 562 of 1991, as common questions of law and fact arise in all these appeals. Brief facts for deciding the limited question raised in these appeals have, however, been extracted from LPA No. 562 of 1991.

2. Pursuant to notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) issued on December 7, 1977, land measuring 66 Kanals 17 Marlas situated in village Kahlwan, Tehsil & District Jalandhar, was acquired for construction of 132 KV Sub Station, Kartarpur at Village Kahlwan, by the Punjab State Electricity Board. Land Acquisition Collector assessed the market value of the land at the relevant time, i.e. on the date when notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued @ Rs. 113/- per marla. Dissatisfied with the inadequate compensation assessed by the Land Acquisition Collector, claimants, who are respondents in the present appeals, maintained reference under Section 18 of the Act. Learned Additional District Judge enhanced the market value from the one assessed by the Land Acquisition Collector to Rs. 264.70 per marla. Aggrieved, PSEB filed FRA culminating into order of Learned Single Judge dated March 1, 1989 vide which, even though market value assessed by the Learned Additional District Judge was upheld, respondents herein were held entitled to grant of Statutory benefits of the amended provisions of the Act, i.e. Sections 23 (1-A), 23(2) and 28.

3. Inasmuch as, in view of the PSEB, claimant-respondent was not entitled to the benefit of amended provisions of the Act, PSEB maintained an application under Section 151 read with Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which resulted in partial success. Vide orders dated February 21, 1991, Learned single Judge disposed of the application aforesaid with the observations that claimants were not entitled to the statutory benefit of amended provisions contained in Section 23(1-A) of the Act as award was rendered by the Land Acquisition Collector on April, 26, 1978 i.e. prior to April 30, 1982. Learned Single Judge relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in Union of India v. Mr. Filip Tiago De Gama, 1990(1) SCC 277, for partly accepting the aforesaid application filed by the appellants. It is against this order of the Learned Single Judge that the present LPAs have been filed.

4. Mr. Toor, learned counsel for the appellants vehemently contends that inasmuch as the Land Acquisition Collector rendered his award on April 26, 1978 whereas learned Additional District Judge decided reference under Section 18 of the Act on July 26, 1980, respondents were not entitled to the benefits of amended provisions of the Act as contained in Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 and, therefore, the civil miscellaneous, resulting into order dated February 21, 1991, ought to have been allowed in toto. For his aforestated contention, learned counsel relies upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Raghubir Singh and other, AIR 1989 SC 1933. The proposition of law as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants, could not be disputed during the course of arguments. In fact, in view of the settled law on the proposition, as advanced by learned counsel for the appellants, it had to be conceded by Mr. Nehra that the claimants were not entitled to any of the benefits accruing to the claimants under Sections 23(1-A), 23(2) and 28 of the Act. He, however, endeavours to maintain the order passed by the learned Single Judge on the sole ground that application under Section 151 read with Section 152 C.P.C. was wholly incompetent. Same, in submission of the learned counsel, was filed with a view to avoid delay that had been caused in the matter inasmuch as only an application for review could be filed and that too within a period of thirty days from the date when order in the RFA was passed. For his aforestated conten