Amol Rattan Singh, J.

1. Learned counsel for the petitioners relies upon three judgments of coordinate Benches of this court, as also a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Aneeta Hada v. M/s. Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd., 2012(2) RAJ 562, to contend that where the company or partnership firm itself has not been impleaded as a respondent in the complaint filed, proceedings against the directors/partners/other officers and officials of the company or partnership, cannot be sustained. As such, in the present case, where, though a partner of M/s. Shivalik Agro Chemicals, Mohali, and its Chief Chemist, have been impleaded as respondents in the complaint filed before the trial court, the firm itself not having been impleaded, proceedings cannot be sustained. Mr. Anil Chaudhary, learned D.A.G., Punjab, submits that the explanation to Section 33 of the Insecticides Act, 1968, states that for the purpose of the said Section, the company would mean any body corporate and would include a firm 'or other association of individuals'. He further submits that the petitioners would be covered by the last phrase, i.e. 'or other association of individuals'.

2. This, obviously, cannot be the interpretation given to the said phrase, in view of the fact that this phrase is intended to cover any other association, which is not a company or a firm. In the present case, it is a firm, i.e. M/s. Shivalik Agro Chemicals, Mohali, which had manufactured the insecticides, which has, admittedly, not been impleaded as party in the complaint (Annexure P-1). Section 33 of the Insecticides Act, 1968, is reproduced further down in this judgment and it obviously applies to both, Companies and Firms, as can be seen from clause (a) of the Explanation given in the provision itself.

3. It has been held in Aneeta Hada's case (supra), which dealt with the provisions of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, as also with Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, that arraying of only a person/s incharge of the company, without arraying the company itself, is not permissible.

4. After considering various judgments on the issue, their Lordships arrived at a conclusion that the law laid down in the case of Sheoratan Agarwal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1985 (1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 53 : (1984) 4 SCC 352, is not correctly laid down and the ratio of the law laid down in the case of State of Madras v. C.V. Parekh, 1973 SCC 491, would hold. Para 59 of the Aneeta Hadas' case holds as under:

59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can only be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself. We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh (supra) which is a three- Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view expressed in Sheoratan Agarwal (supra) does not correctly lay down the law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Aneeta Hada (supra) is overruled with the qualifier as stated in paragraph 37. The decision in Modi Distilleries (supra) has to be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been explained by us hereinabove.

5. Though the Supreme Court was primarily dealing with the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, however, it also dealt with Section 10 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. That provision is pari materia with Section 33 of the Insecticides Act, 1968, which is what the present petition is concerned with.

6. Section 10 of the 1955 Act, was also dealt with in C.V. Parekhs' case, which has been held to be good law.

Section 33 of the Act of 1968 stipulates as under:-

33. Offences by companies. (1) Whenever an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, a person who at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of,