Mr. Raj Mohan Singh, J.: - Petitioner seeks quashing of complaint No.5/12 dated 27.01.2012, under Section 3 (k) (i), 17, 18, 19 and 33 of Insecticide Act, 1968 read with Rule 10(4) and Rule 27(5) of Insecticide Rules, 1971 titled as State vs. M/s Bajwa Kheti Store & Others along with summoning order dated 27.01.2012 with all subsequent proceedings. Petitioner is the Director of the company namely M/s Modern Insecticide Ltd., Ludhiana, which is a registered manufacturer of various types of insecticide and pesticides. Company is having a valid licence issued by competent authority under Insecticide Act, 1968.

2. On 19.01.2011 Jagwinder Singh-Insecticide Inspector visited the shop of one dealer M/s Bajwa Kheti Store, VPO Jamarai, Tehsil Khadoor Sahib, District Tarn Taran and took sample of insecticide namely Piroxofob Propanyl 15% WP, brand Clipper, batch No.MJ-091210, date of manufacture December-2009, expiry date November-2011.

3. The aforesaid material was alleged to be manufactured by the said Company and supplied through the distributors namely Jhand Trading Company, Jandiala Guru, Distt. Amritsar. Out of three parts of the sample, one sample was sent to State Insecticide Testing Lab, Bathina for analysis and was found to be misbranded. Referral part of the sample was found to be misbranded after reanalysis by Central Insecticide Lab, Faridbad showing active ingredients 13.4% against 15%.

4. After issuance of show cause by the office of Chief Agriculture Officer, Tarn Taran and receipt of reply, complaint was filed on 27.01.2012 in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tarn Taran who took cognizance and passed order dated 27.01.2012 summoning the petitioner.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon Section 33 of the Insecticide Act, to show whether the person was Incharge and responsible for day to day activity of the Company. Section 33(1) and (2) are reproduced here as under:-

“Section 33 – Offences by companies – (1) Whenever an offence under this Act has been committed by a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly;

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to any punishment if he proves that he offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such offence.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of , or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the company, such Director, Manager, Secretary or other office shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.

Explanation – For the purposes of this section

(a) “company” means any body corporate, and includes a firm or other association of individuals; and

(b) “director” in relation to a firm means a partner in the firm”

6. While referring to Section 33(2), learned counsel for the petitioner states that word proved used in sub-section has its own connotation that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) the Director can only be prosecuted if it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of the Director, Manager, Secretary and any other officer then he shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against.

7. According to learned counsel deeming fiction qua proceeding against Director is that if offence under this Act has been proved. He also referred to para 19 of the complaint to show averments made therein in respect of mandatory requiremen