The main legal point established in the judgment is the necessity of a written complaint by a competent public servant for taking cognizance of an offence under Section 188 IPC, and the requirement of providing sufficient safeguards for escape from premises to sustain a charge under Section 308 IPC.

AMOL RATTAN SINGH, J.

1. In this petition, the petitioners seek quashing of the charges framed against them by the learned trial court (Additional Sessions Judge, Gurgaon), vide the impugned order dated 06.01.2017, for the alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 188, 290 and 308 of the IPC read with Section 34 thereof.

2. Mr. Ahluwalia, learned counsel for the petitioners, first points to the FIR, Annexure P-3, dated 25.07.2015, registered at Police Station DLF Phase I, alleging therein the commission of offences punishable under Sections 336, 290, 188, all read with Section 34 IPC (the FIR number being 0252).

3. Learned counsel contends that as a matter of fact since all the offences alleged in the FIR were those that were punishable with imprisonment of less than one year, in the report filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., it was stated that an offence punishable under Section 308 of the IPC had been added to the FIR on 15.07.2016.

4. He submits that this addition is shown to have been made as per the challan, only because the limitation would otherwise have run out for the court to take cognizance of the offences originally alleged in the FIR, in terms of Sections 468 and 469 Cr.P.C.

5. Mr. Ahluwalia next cites a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Muniappan and others v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2010 SC 3718, as regards the charge framed under Section 188 of the IPC; and as regard non-culpability of the petitioners for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 308 IPC, he has cited judgments of the Supreme Court in Sushil Ansal v. State through CBI, 2015(10) SCC 359 and Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy v. Sushil Ansal and another AIR 2017 (SC) 976, to submit that even where deaths unfortunately took place in premises that did not cater to safety measures by way of providing sufficient number of exits therefrom, no charge under Section 302 or 304 of the IPC was sustained, the conviction having been for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304A IPC; and therefore, in the present case, no mishap having taken place at all, imputation of mens rea for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 308 IPC, is wholly unsustainable.

6. He also cites a judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Dr. Mani Kumar Chhetri v. State of West Bengal, 2017(3) Cal.L.T. 655.

7. Mr. Surender Singh, learned AAG, Haryana, very fairly does not oppose the quashing of the charge framed under Section 188 IPC, in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Muniappans' case (supra), but submits that as regards charge framed under Section 308 IPC, the petitioner not having provided enough safeguards for escape from their premises, the charge under Section 308 IPC is fully sustainable, with of course evidence to be appraised by the trial court during the course of the trial. He submits that this Court would not interfere in the framing of the charge under the said provision.

8. He also cites judgments of the Supreme Court in Durgacharan Naik and others v. State of Orissa AIR 1966 (SC) 1775 and Pankaj Agarwal and others v. State of Delhi and another, 2001(5) JT 233.

(As regards the second judgment, he refers to it to submit that even if this Court holds that the charge framed under Section 188 is not sustainable, the trial would continue qua the remaining charges).

9. Having considered the arguments on both sides, I find myself eventually in agreement with the learned counsel for the petitioner, as regards the question of maintainability of charges for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 188 and 308 of the IPC.

10. In the present case, it is not disputed at all that (luckily) no untoward accident/occurrence took place by which anybody was injured etc., due to the petitioners not having provided adequate number of exits from their premises.

11. Though in the prima facie opinion of this Court, as had been conveyed on the previous date of hearing, knowledge could be imputed to the