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2019 Supreme(P&H) 268
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
Shekher Dhawan, J.
Akashdeep Hayer And Another - Appellants
Vs.
State of U.T., Chandigarh And Another - Respondents
Criminal Miscellaneous (M) No. 64530 of 2018
Decided On : 13-03-2019
Important Points
Subject
Criminal Law - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings
Act Referred
EMIGRATION ACT : S.24(g)
INDIAN PENAL CODE : S.420, S.120(b), S.323
Headnote
Quashing - Compromise - IPC, Emigration Act - 420, 120-B, 24(g)
Fact of the Case:
The petitioners sought to quash an FIR and judgment of conviction based on a compromise. The compromise was found to be genuine, and the court considered previous judgments on compounding of offenses, including the interpretation of relevant provisions by the Supreme Court.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the compromise between the parties was genuine and that the matter primarily affected the parties involved, not the society at large. It considered previous judgments and ruled that the case fell within the category where quashing of criminal proceedings was appropriate.
Issues: The main issue was whether the court should quash the FIR and judgment of conviction based on a genuine compromise between the parties.
Ratio Decidendi: The court applied the principle that the power to quash criminal proceedings based on a compromise should consider the nature and gravity of the crime, the impact on society, and the fairness of continuing the criminal proceeding despite a settlement between the victim and the wrongdoer.
Final Decision: The petition to quash the FIR and judgment of conviction was accepted, and all consequent proceedings were quashed based on the compromise. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence were set aside, rendering the appeal in-fructuous.
Angel Sharma, Adv., Manish Jain, Adv., Arnav Sood, Adv., Parikshit Singh, Adv.
Shekher Dhawan, J.
Present petition is for quashing of FIR No.33 dated 08.02.2014 under Sections 420, 120-B of IPC and Section 24 (g) Emigration Act, 1983 registered at Police Station Sector-36, Chandigarh, District Chandigarh, as well as the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 09.09.2016, passed by Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Chandigarh, on the basis of compromise dated 29.09.2018 (Annexure P3). The petitioners were convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years each with fine of Rs.5,000/- each under Sections 420 and 120-B of IPC; rigorous imprisonment for two years each under Section 24(G) of Emigration Act.
2. During the course of preliminary hearing, this Court directed the trial Court to record the statements of all the concerned parties, with regard to the genuineness and validity or otherwise of the compromise dated 29.09.2018 (Annexure P-3).
3. In compliance thereof, report of Additional Sessions Judge, Chandigarh has been received through District & Sessions Judge, Chandigarh, in which, it has been mentioned that a genuine compromise has been effected between the parties.
4. Learned counsel for the parties relied upon the judgment passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in case "Joginder Ram and others v. State of Punjab and another, (2009) 1 RCR(Cri) 495" wherein the appellant was acquitted under Section 323 IPC on the basis of compromise, after conviction by the lower Court.
5. The Hon'ble Full Bench of this Court in case "Kulwinder Singh v. State of Punjab and another, (2007) 3 RCR(Cri) 1052" and Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in case "Sube Singh and another v. State of Haryana and another, (2013) 4 RCR(Cri) 102" observed that compounding of offence can be allowed even after conviction, during proceedings of the appeal against conviction pending in Sessions Court and in case of involving non-compoundable offence.
6. An identical question came to be decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case Gian Singh Versus State of Punjab and another, (2012) 4 RCR(Cri) 543. Having interpreted the relevant provisions and considering a line of the judgment on the pointed points, it was ruled (para 57) as under:-
"57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences ar
