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2018 Supreme(P&H) 3411
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATES OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
G.S. Sandhawalia, J.
Bhawanjit Singh - Appellant
Versus
National Highway Authority Of India And Others - Respondent
Civil Writ Petition No. 16870 of 2017
Decided On : 26-04-2018
R.S. Randhawa, Adv., Charanjit Sharma, Adv., J.K. Sidhu, Adv., K.S. Boparai, Adv., Chiranshu Bansal, Adv., Vikram Singh, Adv.
The Competent Authority under the National Highways Act, 1956 does not have the power to adjudicate the claim of apportionment and is obligated to refer the dispute to the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction.
Headnote:
NATIONAL HIGHWAYS ACT - Dispute over Compensation Apportionment - Section 3(G), Section 3-H - Summary of Acts and Sections: The court discussed the provisions of Section 3H(4) of the National Highways Act, 1956 and emphasized that the Competent Authority does not have the power to adjudicate the claim of apportionment made by the parties. It highlighted the obligation to refer the dispute to the decision of the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated. The court directed the respondent to adhere to the provisions and refer the application to the said Court for further adjudication.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner sought a writ in the nature of Mandamus to apportion the compensation calculated under Section 3(G) of the National Highways Act, 1956, due to a dispute regarding the apportionment of the compensation for acquired land.
Finding of the Court:
The court directed the respondent to adhere to the provisions of Section 3H(4) of the Act and refer the application to the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction for further adjudication.
Issues: Dispute over apportionment of compensation for acquired land under the National Highways Act, 1956.
Ratio Decidendi: The Competent Authority does not have the power to adjudicate the claim of apportionment made by the parties and is obligated to refer the dispute to the decision of the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction within the limits of whose jurisdiction the land is situated.
Final Decision: The present writ petition is disposed of with a direction to the respondent to adhere to the provisions of Section 3H(4) of the Act and refer the application to the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction for further adjudication.
JUDGMENT
G.S. Sandhawalia, J. - Prayer in the present writ petition, filed under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India, is for issuance of a writ in the nature of Mandamus, to apportion the amount of compensation calculated/determined under Section 3(G) of the Naitonal Highways Act, 1956 (for short the 'Act'), in accordance with Section 3-H, on account of the dispute regarding the apportionment of the compensation.
2. The petitioner has approached this Court on account of the fact that an award was passed on 04.08.2016 (Annexure P-3) under the 1956 Act, for the five villages. The petitioner claims to be owner in possession in Khasra Nos.18//11/2/2, 12/2, 13/2, 14/2, 15/2, 17/1, 18/1, 18/5, 19/1, 20/1/2, Khata No.143/150, as per Jamabandi for the year 2013-14 of Village Ladhran (Byepass Samrala), Tehsil Samrala, District Ludhiana. It is his grouse that he had filed an application dated 19.12.2016 (Annexure P-4) to respondent No.2 that the private-respondents were co-sharers and they had no right in the residential and commercial land, which was acquired for making Samrala Byepass and that they were co-sharers in the agricultural portion. It is further his case that since the matter was not being referred for apportionment of the compensation for the acquired land, he had approached this Court in CWP No.33 of 2017, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 09.01.2017 (Annexure P-5) on the ground that there was no presumption that the authorities would not act as per law. He was, accordingly, given liberty to pursue that remedy.
3. Respondent No.1, in its reply, took the plea that it was for respondent No.2 to refer the dispute to the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction under Section 3H (4) of the Act.
4. Respondent No.2, in its reply, has submitted that application was rejected on the ground that as per the revenue record, the land was joint and no partition had taken place. Reference is also made to order passed by the Court of Shri Arunvir Kaushal, Civil Judge (Sr.Division) Ludhiana on 14.11.2003 that there was no stay on the sale or mortgage of share of the petitioner. It was further averred that it was not within the competence of authorities to award compensation to only one co-sharer instead of all the co-sharers, as per the revenue record.
5. Respondents No.3 to 6, in their reply, had taken the plea that they had purchased land measuring 19 kanals from Sham Kaur, through registered sale deed dated 01.11.1973 and some part of the land was acquired as per the award and they were also entitled for compensation. They also claimed possession over specific portion and took the plea that they should be paid compensation according to the area acquired out of their ownership and possession as per the award.
6. Private respondents No.7 to 11, in their reply, took the plea that they were co-sharers and therefore, owners in possession of every inch of the joint estate and there was no dispute with regard to apportionment of disbursement of compensation and that the construction of the house, godowns, electric motor, plinth was under joint ownership and had been constructed jointly. No partition had taken place and therefore, they were entitled for equal compensation and the apportionment had rightly been done.
7. Counsel for the petitioner has rightly relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Nirmal Singh Vs. Union of India & others , (2012) 4 RCR(Civ) 44 and Ram Sarup & others Vs. Union of India & others , (2016) 184 PunLR 50, wherein the provisions of Section 3H (4) of the Act have been taken into consideration and it has been held that it does not fall within the domain of the competent authority to decide as to who is entitled for compensation. Relevant observations made in Nirmal Singh's case read as under:
"8. It is true that the Act is a special statute which has clothed the Central Government with the power to acquire any land for a public purpose, which is required for building, maintenance, man
