The main legal point established in the judgment is that the provision of Section 437(6) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not mandatory, and the court can refuse bail by recording reasons in writing. The court also has the authority to exercise inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code to secure the ends of justice.

JUDGMENT

Daya Chaudhary, J. - Crm No.42568 of 2018

This application is for placing on record Annexure A-1 (Colly).

Application is allowed and Annexure A-1 (Colly) annexed with the application is taken on record.

CRM-M No. 29702 of 2018

2. Petitioner Vinod Kumar has filed the present petition under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the "Code") for grant of regular bail to him in case FIR No.269 dated 02.04.2016 under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471, 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 registered at Police Station City, Hisar, during pendency of the trial.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has falsely been implicated in the case, whereas he has has no concern with the alleged offence in any manner. Even a single penny has not been received by him from the bank. He is not the beneficiary of the loan amount disbursed by the complainant company and no recovery, whatsoever, has been effected from him by the police. Learned counsel also submits that the only role attributed to him is that he was presented by co-accused Rajesh alias Sonu and Ashish Bansal before Sub Registrar as well as before financial company as Ram Naryan without his knowledge and by keeping him in dark. The investigation has been completed and no incriminating evidence has been collected by the investigating agency against him. At the end, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is in custody since 27.03.2018. There is no progress in the trial as only the challan has been presented, still the trial may take long time to conclude and the petitioner is entitled for bail under the statutory provisions of Section 437 (6) of the Code. In support of his arguments, he has also placed reliance upon judgment of this Court in case Sukhdev Singh Vs. State of Punjab , (2009) 3 RCR(Cri) 291.

4. Learned State counsel has opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner has not moved any application for grant of benefit of the provision as envisaged under Section 437(6) of the Code and without moving any such application, he cannot take such benefit from this Court. However, the custody period undergone by the petitioner has not been disputed.

5. Heard arguments of learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the zimni orders as well as other documents available on the record.

6. Section 437 (6) of the Code is relevant for resolving the controversy in the case in hand, which is reproduced as under : -

"437. When bail may be taken in case of non-bailable offence.

(1) xx xx xx

(2) xx xx xx

(3) xx xx xx

(4) xx xx xx

(5) xx xx xx

(6) If, in any case triable by a Magistrate, the trial of a person accused of any non-bailable offence is not concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case, such person shall, if he is in custody during the whole of the said period, be released on bail to the satisfaction of the Magistrate, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs.

(7) xx xx xx"

7. The above said provision mandates that in case of non-bailable offence, which is being tried by a Magistrate and the trial has not been concluded within a period of sixty days from the first date fixed for taking evidence in the case and the accused has remained in custody during whole of the said period, he becomes entitled to be released on bail. However, the Magistrate can decline the benefit of aforesaid provisions by recording reasons in writing.

8. On perusal of the zimni orders, which have been placed on record by moving separate application by learned counsel for the petitioner, which have not been disputed by learned State counsel, it is evident that the trial has not been concluded within a period of sixty days from the date of framing of the charge or the first date fixed for recording statement of the prosecution witnesses and the accused remained in cu