The importance of ensuring the defendant's knowledge of the date of hearing and the consequences of making false statements to obtain legal orders.

JUDGMENT

Ajay Tewari, J. (Oral) - This petition has been filed challenging the order of the Rent Controller allowing a petition under Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 filed by the respondent.

2. The solitary contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the application for leave to defend which was filed by the petitioner-tenant was wrongly dismissed because due service as envisaged under Section 18-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 was not effected. He has pointed out the heading of the petition is as follows :-

"Petition Under Section 13-B Of The East Punjab Rent Restriction Act, For Recovery Of Immediate Possession By Eviction Of The Respondent/Tenant From Demised Premises I.E. Entire Ground And First Floor Of Sco No. 26-27, Phase-Vii, Sas Nagar, Mohali"

3. As per him, the respondent No.2 has been impleaded individually and actually only respondent No.1 was the party. He has argued that service on respondent No.2 was not validly effected and consequently, there was no service in the eyes of law. It may be mentioned here that service on respondent No.2 was effected on 10.9.2013. While as per learned counsel for the petitioners, service on respondent No.1 was effected only on 14.9.2013 by registered post and therefore the application for leave to defend which was filed on 27.9.2013 was well in time. He has pointed out that under Section 18-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, apart from the ordinary mode of service as prescribed under Order 5 of the first schedule of the CPC two more modes of service are mandatory, one by registered post and second by affixation and admittedly, there is no evidence of those two modes having been used. As per him, since there was no service by ordinary process/affixation on the respondent No.1 this is a case where service was not properly effected. Moreover, as per him service on respondent No.2 is no service in the eyes of law because respondent No.2 was neither a necessary or a proper party.

4. On the contrary, counsel for the respondent has argued that the petitioner is raising unnecessarily pedantic and technicalistic plea and has managed to thwart the order for a period of four years by these pleas which are merely jugglery of words. He has pointed out that respondent No.1 was the Punjab National Bank while respondent No.2 was the Manager of the Branch of Punjab National Bank which was the tenant.

5. In my considered opinion, it cannot be said that the respondent No.2 is neither a necessary or a proper party. It is well known that most (if not in all) litigations in which various public sector Banks are involved, the Manager of the concerned Branch is normally authorized to prosecute the litigation. For the bank to now argue that the Manager of the concerned Branch is an unrelated person is too much to swallow. There is no explanation why once summons had been received by the Manager on 9.9.2013 the application could not be filed on or before 24.9.2013. The Banks have standing counsel in every city and this was a straightforward application for which no special preparation was required. It is also be to be noticed that the additional modes of service prescribed under Section 18-A are intended to ensure speedy disposal of the case and not to give a handle to the tenant to obstruct the proceedings. As a matter of the fact, it would also be appropriate at this stage to notice the provisions of second proviso to Rule 13 of Order 9 CPC. Rule 9 Order 13 lays down the circumstances in which an ex parte decree can be set aside and the second proviso is to the following effect:-

"Provided further that no Courts shall set aside a decree passed ex parte merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons, if it is satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiff's claim."

6. It is thus clear from this provi