The main legal point established in the judgment is the application of the principles of condonation of delay under Section 17(2) of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987, and the need for a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented approach while dealing with such applications.

JUDGMENT

G.S. Sandhawalia, J. (Oral) - C.M No. 8424-CII of 2016

1. Application for condonation of delay of 160 days in refiling the appeal is preferred. After hearing counsel for the parties and in view of the averments made in the application, the same is allowed and delay of 160 days in refiling the appeal is condoned.

2. C.M stands disposed of.

3. The present appeal under section 23 of the Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987 (for short, 'the Act') barred by 288 days is directed against the order dated 05/06.05.2014 of the Railway Claims Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench (for short, 'the Tribunal'), whereby the Tribunal has dismissed the application filed under Section 17(2) of the Act for condonation of delay of 1368 days in filing the appeal on the ground that the delay is inordinate and neither it has been correctly calculated nor explained properly and beyond the period of one year of limitation.

4. It was also noticed that the deceased - Sahid Ahmed had a major son also who could have looked after the family and file the case within the period of limitation. The claim was only filed on 01.10.2013, though the death had taken place on 29.04.2008. Along with the claim petition an application for delay was also filed under Section 17(2) of the Act. The averments were made in the application were that the complainants were under depression due to death of Sahid and were not aware about Railway Claims Tribunal and their right to claim and documents were not available with the claimants and resultantly they sought condonation of delay. But the application was opposed by the respondents on the ground that no supporting medical document regarding depression has been placed on record and that no details have been given that claimants were not aware of their rights as such.

5. For condonation of delay, sufficient cause would have to be made out as such under Section 17(2) of the Act as the claim petition has admittedly to be filed within one year from the date of the accident though Section 17(2) provides that an application may be entertained after the period specified in sub-section (1) if the applicant satisfies the Claims Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.

6. The noted facts would have to go on to show that there is no such sufficient cause which has been mentioned on account of delay over four years which has occurred in the filing of the claim petition. The Tribunal was right in noticing that there was another male member in the family apart from the wife of the deceased. Therefore in the absence of sufficient cause in the light as such the appellants right to claim become, barred. The delay as such is not nominal which could be condoned at the asking but is substantial and the respondents would also be equally handicapped in leading the defence after considerable period of five years which had lapsed. The principles laid down in the judgment of the Apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors. 2013 (12) SCC 649 are also not satisfied in the facts and circumstances of the present case, which are as under:-

"15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, nonpedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact situation.

iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken no