The main legal point established is that quashing criminal proceedings based on a compromise is permissible under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Section 320 Cr.P.C. to secure the ends of justice.

JUDGMENT

Rajesh Bhardwaj, J. (Oral). - Matter has been taken up through video conferencing via Webex facility in the light of the Pandemic Covid-19 situation and as per instructions.

CRM-24067-2021

For the reasons mentioned in the application, the same is allowed and CRM-M-18507-2019 is taken on Board today itself.

CRM-M-18507-2019

Instant petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. praying for quashing of FIR No.0049 dated 21.01.2018, under Sections 498-A, 323, 406, 506, 34 IPC registered at Police Civil Line, Hisar, District Hisar, and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom on the basis of compromise. FIR in question was got registered by complainant- respondent No.2 namely, Shubra and the investigation commenced thereon. However, with the intervention of respectables, finally the parties arrived at settlement and they resolved their inter se dispute, which is apparent from affidavit/compromise, annexed as Annexure P-2.

On the basis of the compromise, the petitioners are praying that continuation of these proceedings would be a futile exercise and an abuse of process of the Court and thus, the FIR in question and all the subsequent proceedings arising therefrom may be quashed in the interest of justice.

This Court vide order dated 24.03.2021, directed the parties to appear before the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate for recording their statements, as contended before the Court, and the trial Court/Illaqa Magistrate was also directed to send its report.

In pursuance of the same, learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Hisar, sent its report dated 07.05.2021 to this Court. With the report he has also annexed the copy of statements of complainant Shubra; petitioners namely, Amit Mehta, Saroj Kumari, Hukam Singh recorded on 19.04.2021. On the basis of the statements, learned JMIC has concluded in its report that it appears that the parties have entered into a compromise voluntarily and without any pressure and maintaining peace and relations and also that there is no other accused except the petitioners and none of the accused persons was declared proclaimed offender in the case.

I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record and the report sent by learned Judicial Magistrate Ist Class.

The offence involved in the FIR is purely a matrimonial dispute and the petitioners have approached this Court by filing a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for exercising the inherent powers of this Court in favour of the prayer made by the accused.

A bare perusal of statutory provision of the Section 482 Cr.P.C. would show that the High Court may make such orders, as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

Section 320 Cr.P.C. is equally relevant for consideration, which prescribes the procedure for compounding of the offences under the Indian Penal Code.

Admittedly, as per statutory provisions, the offences in FIR are non-compoundable offence and thus, Section 482 Cr.P.C. and Section 320 Cr.P.C. are of utmost importance for decision of the case. Such an issue was appreciated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.S.Joshi and others vs State of Haryana and another (2003) 4 Supreme Court Cases 675. Their Lordships appreciated the issue involved in a very exhaustive manner and laid down as under:-

“8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye’s [(1977) 4 SCC 551] case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extra ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power.

10. In State of Karnataka v. L