Compliance with the mandatory requisites under Section 36A(4) of the NDPS Act is essential for granting extension of time and regulating the right to default bail, as per Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

JUDGMENT

Harkesh Manuja, J. - Present revision petition has been filed challenging the order dated 27.08.2021 passed by the Judge, Special Court, Ludhiana, granting extension of time in favour of prosecution in exercise of powers under Section 36-A(4) of the NDPS Act, 1985, for the purpose of filing of challan.

2. In the present case, the petitioner was nominated as an accused in FIR No.42 dated 27.02.2021 under Sections 22 and 25 of the NDPS Act, Police Station City-2, Khanna, wherein, he was arrested on the same day. Challan in the present case could not be filed within 180 days, therefore, an application came to be filed before the Judge Special Court, Ludhiana, at the instance of prosecution seeking extension of time by invoking Sub-Section 4 to Section 36-A of the NDPS Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), while submitting that there was some delay in preparation of inventory which resulted into non-filing of the challan within the prescribed period. The trial Court vide order dated 27.08.2021, allowed the application filed at the instance of prosecution while granting 10 days extended period for the purpose of filing of challan.

3. Challenging the aforesaid order dated 27.08.2021, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that Special Judge, Ludhiana, while passing the same failed to record specific reasons for detention of petitioner beyond the period of 180 days as enjoined under proviso of Sub-Section 4 to Section 36A of the Act and thus, submits that impugned order being in violation thereof was liable to be set aside.

4. On the other hand, learned State counsel submits that impugned order has been passed by the Special Court on due appreciation of facts while exercising statutory power provided under Sub-Section 4 to Section 36A of the Act and thus, warrants no interference in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the paper book. I find substance in the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner.

6. For the purpose of adjudication of the case in hand, Sub-Section 4 of the Section 36A of the NDPS Act is relevant for consideration and the same is thus reproduced hereunder:

'(4)In respect of persons accused of an offence punishable under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A or for offences involving commercial quantity the references in sub-section (2) of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), thereof to "ninety days", where they occur, shall be construed as reference to "one hundred and eighty days": Provided that, if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the Special Court may extend the said period up to one year on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days. "

7. From a bare reading of proviso to Sub-Section 4 to Section 36A of the Act it becomes clear that for the purpose of exercising powers as regards extension of time in favour of prosecution so as to complete the investigation, the Special Judge, has to consider and comply with two relevant factors; firstly the report submitted by the public prosecutor indicating the progress of investigation and secondly recording of specific reasons for detention of the accused beyond the period of one hundred and eighty days. In the present case, from bare perusal of the impugned order one can easily trace out that the Special Judge granted extension of 10 days time in favour of prosecution so as to file challan without recording any specific reasons for further detention of the petitioner/accused beyond the period of 180 days. Thus, Special Court while passing the impugned order failed to comply with the mandatory requisites as prescribed under Sub-Section 4 to Section 36A of the Act, which in fact regulates the right of an accused nominated under the Act as