JUDGMENT

Aman Chaudhary, J.

The present petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for setting aside the impugned order dated 25.11.2019 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Amritsar in Criminal Appeal No.651 of 2019 in complaint case No.1675 of 2017 dated 10.04.2017, whereby petitioner was ordered to deposit 20% of compensation amount that was imposed, under Section 148 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, while suspending the sentence by learned trial Court within one and half month.

2. Learned counsel submits that a condition for the grant of bail cannot be made onerous for the petitioner. The appellate Court has committed an error as there is no provision for imposing any condition while granting the suspension of sentence. Still further, the non-deposit of compensation cannot be a ground for vacation of the order granting suspension of sentence under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. He contends that once the appeal against the order of conviction preferred is pending, it should be heard on its merit, without insisting on the deposit of the amount as directed by the Court as fine is not recoverable as per Section 357(2) Cr.P.C. Reliance is placed on the judgments in the case of Vivek Sahni v. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. , 2019 SCC Online P&H 2668, Ajay Vinodchandra Shah and others v. State of Maharashtra and others , 2019 ACD 399 and Dilip S.Dahanukar v. Kotak Mahindra Co. Ltd. , (2007) 6 SCC 528 .

3. Though, none has put appearance on behalf of the respondent but in the reply filed by her, it has been stated that the appellate Court has rightly passed the impugned order under section 148 NI Act, imposing the condition to deposit 20% of the compensation amount. To support the same, reference was made to Hon'ble The Supreme Court judgment in case of Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi, (2019) 11 SCC 341 .

4. Heard.

5. The core question that emanates in this petition for determination is "Whether on account of non-payment of the amount as directed under section 148 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, suspension of sentence granted to the appellant will be automatically or consequentially cancelled?"

6. Before delving upon the merits of the case, it would be apposite to advert to the relevant statutory provision involved, which reads thus:

"148. Power of Appellate Court to order payment pending appeal against conviction.-

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in an appeal by the drawer against conviction under section 138, the Appellate Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum of twenty per cent of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court:

Provided that the amount payable under this subsection shall be in addition to any interim compensation paid by the appellant under section 143A.

(2) The amount referred to in sub-section (1) shall be deposited within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the appellant.

(3) The Appellate Court may direct the release of the amount deposited by the appellant to the complainant at any time during the pendency of the appeal:

Provided that if the appellant is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the appellant the amount so released, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning o