The court upheld the land acquisition for educational purposes, dismissing the petition due to unexplained delay and affirming the public good served by the land's current use.

JUDGMENT

Sureshwar Thakur, J.

Through the issuance of notification dated 2.8.1976 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short 'the Act of 1894'), which became succeeded by a declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act on 24.6.1977, and, through consequent thereto award becoming made on 24.1.1978, thereby the subject lands became acquired.

2. The acquisition proceedings (supra), as became launched in respect of the subject lands brought grievance to the land losers concerned, and, one of them instituted CWP No. 2120 of 1990 before this Court, whereby a challenge was made to the notifications (supra), and, to the consequent thereto award.

3. On the said writ petition, the order dated 7.2.1991 (Annexure P-4) became passed by this Court. The contents of Annexure P-4 are extracted hereinafter.

"The learned counsel for the petitioner states that land was acquired for the purpose of developmental of a mandi. After the development of the mandi, some land has been left over as unutilized. The petitioner has made a representation to the State Government for the release of the said land. We hope that the respondents will consider the representation of the petitioner compassionately. There are no ground to interfere in this petition.

4. A reading of the above extracted contents reveals, that on the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, that there has been a change in the public purpose stated in the acquisition notifications, inasmuch as, it was stated thereins that the land was acquired for purpose of development of a mandi, and, the said public purpose has not been executed, at the subject sites, thereupon on the learned counsel stating that the petitioner had made a representation before the competent authority concerned, for the release of the subject lands, thus this Court made a direction, upon the respondents concerned, to consider the validity of the said representation, therebys the said writ petition was closed.

5. However, there is no order, as such, as became passed by the competent authority concerned, on the said representation, nor also the petitioner instituted any contempt petition before this Court for contempt actions being drawn against the respondent concerned, arising from omission on his part to pass a speaking order on the representation (supra), as became preferred for purpose (supra) before the competent authority. Resultantly, therebys it appears, that the petitioner waived the grounds, as became raised in the representation, besides it prima facie appears, that he also did not make any representation, as such, nor there was any occasion as such, for the respondents concerned, to pass any speaking order thereovers.

6. Be that as it may, the successors-in-interest of the petitioner in writ petition (supra) instituted CWP No. 497 of 2012, before this Court, on the grounds similar to the ones, as became raised in the earlier writ petition, and, on the said writ petition, in the operative part thereof, operative part whereof becomes extracted hereinafter, the writ petition became declared to suffer from the vice of delay and latches. In sequel, the said writ petition also became dismissed on 9.1.2012 (Annexure P-9)

"In the present case, the land has been transferred to respondent No. 5 for playground of a school. The playground of a school satisfies the test of a public purpose as well. Still further, the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner claiming almost the same relief stands dismissed in the year 1991. The present writ petition filed after 21 years of the transfer of land to the private respondents suffers from delay and latches as well. There is no explanation of the delay nor has the petitioner availed the remedy against the orders passed in the year 1991.

Consequently, we do not find any merit in the present petition.

Dismissed."

7. The reasons, as set-forth in the order passed by this Court, upon the writ petition (supra), apart from this Court declaring the said