The principle that there can be no second FIR for the same cognizable offence, and further investigation can be conducted as a connected cognizable offence committed in the course of the same transaction.

By filing the present Criminal Misc. Case, the petitioners seek to quash FIR No. 92/2013 dated 6-5-2013 under Section 467/468/471/181/120(B) of the Indian Penal Code (for short IPC) registered against them by the Sadar Police Station, Gangtok.

2. It is the case of the petitioners that the Jorethang Police Station, South Sikkim, had registered a case against them under those very provisions under FIR No. 51/2012 dated 1-9-2012 with regard to the very same offence as in FIR No. 92/2013 dated 6-5-2013 registered by the Sadar Police Station, Gangtok.

3. Mr. K. T. Bhutia, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners, submits that grave injustice has been caused to the petitioners to have the second FIR lodged against them for the same offence and to face the ordeals of investigation once again. This is all the more so when charge-sheet in respect of the first FIR has already been filed in a competent Court. It is submitted that the subject-matter of the second FIR can at best be an evidence against the petitioners for the offences laid in the first FIR. Reference was made by him to Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. The Central Bureau of Investigation, 2013 (5) Scale 407 : (AIR 2013 SC (Cri) 1169) more particularly paragraph 52 thereof, in support of his contention.

4. Mr. J. B. Pradhan, learned Additional Advocate General and Public Prosecutor appearing for the State, submits that position of law placed on behalf of the petitioners is well settled and that in Shivshankar Singh v. State of Bihar, (2012) 1 SCC 130 and Babubhai v. State of Gujarat (2010) 12 SCC 254 : (2010 AIR SCW 5126) the ratio has been re-emphasised. We may reproduce the following portions stressed upon by Mr. Pradhan :

13. In Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.) (AIR 1979 SC 1791) this Court considered a case wherein two FIRs had been lodged. The first one formed part of a subsequent larger conspiracy which came to light on receipt of fresh information. Some of the conspirators were common in both the FIRs and the object of conspiracy in both the cases was not the same. This Court while considering the question as to whether investigation and further proceedings on the basis of both the FIRs was permissible held that no straitjacket formula can be laid down in this regard. The only test whether two FIRs can be permitted to exist was whether the two conspiracies were identical or not. After considering the facts of the said case, the Court came to the conclusion that both conspiracies were not identical. Therefore, lodging of two FIRs was held to be permissible.

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20. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the subject emerges to the effect that an FIR under Section 154, Cr. P.C. is a very important document. It is the first information of a cognizable offence recorded by the officer- in-charge of the police station. It sets the machinery of criminal law in motion and marks the commencement of the investigation which ends with the formation of an opinion under Sections 169 or 170, Cr. P.C. as the case may be, and forwarding of a police report under Section 173, Cr. P.C. Thus, it is quite possible that more than one piece of information be given to the police officer in-charge of the police station in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences. In such a case, he need not enter each piece of information in the diary. All other information given orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation into the facts mentioned in the first information report will be statements falling under Section 162, Cr. P.C.

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(Emphasis supplied)

5. Mr. Pradhan submits that if the case falls within the purview of the ratio set out above, the petitioners shall be entitled to the reliefs sought for in the present case. It is, however, submitted that the second FIR is in respect of a distinct offence and not at all identical to the first one and,