THE HIGH COURT OF SIKKIM : GANGTOK
MEENAKSHI MADAN RAI, J.
The Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited. – Appellant
versus
Dechen Ongmoo Lepcha and Others – Respondents
I.A. No.01 of 2020 in MAC App. No.11 of 2020
Decided On : 19-03-2021
Delay Condonation - Motor Vehicles Act - Section 173(1) - [173(1)] - The court discussed the provisions of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, emphasizing the requirement to prove 'sufficient cause' for delay in filing an appeal. The court referred to legal precedents to interpret 'sufficient cause' and highlighted the principles of liberal approach, lack of bona fides, and the conduct and attitude of the party seeking condonation of delay. The court concluded that the delay could not be condoned based on the facts and circumstances presented, dismissing the application and the appeal.
Fact of the Case:
The Petitioner sought condonation of 261 days' delay in filing the Appeal under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the delay could not be condoned as the Petitioner failed to provide sufficient cause for the delay, and the Circulars issued by the High Court after the period of limitation had expired were deemed irrelevant.
Issues: Delay condonation under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.
Ratio Decidendi: The court emphasized the requirement to prove 'sufficient cause' for delay in filing an appeal, citing legal precedents and principles of liberal approach, lack of bona fides, and the conduct and attitude of the party seeking condonation of delay.
Final Decision: I.A. No.01 of 2020 and the Appeal were dismissed, and I.A. No.02 of 2020 was also disposed of, with no order as to costs.
ORDER :
Meenakshi Madan Rai, J.
1. The instant application is filed by the Petitioner/ Appellant under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“M.V. Act”), seeking condonation of 261 (two hundred and sixty one) days’ delay in filing the Appeal.
2. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Appellant, while making an effort to justify the delay, submitted that the impugned Judgment was pronounced on 31.10.2019, copy of the Judgment was sought on 05.11.2019 vide application which was ready on 26.11.2019. The Appeal came to be filed on 05.11.2020 however after curing the defects was re-submitted on 11.12.2020. The limitation period of 90 (ninety) days admittedly, was over on 19.02.2020, as per Learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Appellant. Reliance was placed by Learned Counsel on the Circulars issued by the Registry of this High Court from 24.03.2020 after the lockdown owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. That, in view of the facts submitted hereinabove, the delay be condoned.
3. Learned Counsel appearing for Respondents No.1 and 2, Respondent No.3 and Respondent No.4 objected to the Petition on grounds that the Appeal ought to have been filed on 19.02.2020 and reliance by the Petitioner/Appellant on the Circulars issued by the High Court is erroneous as the first Circular, dated 24.03.2020, was issued almost a month after the period of limitation was over and was concerned with the lockdown after the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. The other Circulars dated 14.04.2020 and 18.04.2020 also have no relevance to the instant matter. That, as no other grounds have been specified for the delay, in such circumstances, the Petition merits no consideration.
4. I have heard Learned Counsel for the parties and considered their submissions. I have also perused the Petition and the Memo of Appeal.
5. The provisions of Section 173 of the M.V. Act which deals with Appeals may relevantly be considered, which is extracted hereinbelow;
Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court: Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. (2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees.” [emphasis supplied]
6. It is clear from the second proviso supra that the High Court may entertain the Appeal after expiry of the period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the Appellant was prevented by “sufficient cause” from preferring the Appeal in time. Thus, the Appellant is required to prove “sufficient cause” for the delay. While explaining what “sufficient cause” entails, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Basawaraj and Another vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 held inter alia as follows; “11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201].)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so
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