The judgment reinforces that delays in reporting sexual offenses against minors do not invalidate the prosecution's case if corroborated by credible evidence.

JUDGMENT

Meenakshi Madan Rai, J. -The victim, a ten year old child was allegedly subjected to penetrative sexual assault four times by the Appellant, a fifty-three year old man, in March, 2020. Her mother at the relevant time was ailing and hospitalised and her father was tending to her. On 08-05-2020, PW-2 the father of the victim on coming to learn of the sexual assault from PW-6 the child's grandmother, lodged Exhibit 2 the FIR, stating the afore-mentioned facts and seeking early legal relief.

2. The investigation of the case was taken up by PW-16 the Investigating Officer, who submitted Charge-Sheet against the Appellant under Sections 376/354 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, 'IPC'), read with Sections 6/8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter, 'POCSO Act'). The Learned Trial Court framed Charge against the Appellant under Section 5(l) of the POCSO Act for committing aggravated penetrative sexual assault repeatedly on the minor victim, under Section 5(m) of the POCSO Act, for committing aggravated penetrative sexual assault on a child below 12 years of age and under Section 5(n) for committing aggravated penetrative sexual assault on the child being a relative of the Appellant through blood or adoption or marriage. The penalty for all the offences supra are prescribed under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. Charge was also framed against the Appellant under Sections 376(2)(n), 376(3) and 354 of the IPC.

(i) The Appellant pleaded 'not guilty' to all of the charges framed against him and on his claim for trial, the Prosecution examined sixteen witnesses to establish its case. The Learned Trial Court on examination of the Appellant under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter 'Cr.P.C.'), hearing the opposing arguments of the Learned Counsel for the parties and analysing the evidence on record, convicted the Appellant vide the impugned Judgment, dated 20-12-2022, under Section 5(l) and Section 5(m) punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and under Sections 376(2)(n) and Section 376(3) of the IPC. He was acquitted of the offence under Section 5(n)/6 of the POCSO Act and under Section 354 IPC.

(ii) By the Order on Sentence dated 21-12-2022, the Appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of twenty years and to pay a fine of ? 3,000/- (Rupees three thousand) only, for the offence under Section 5(l)/6 and 5(m)/6 of the POCSO Act and Section 376(3) of the IPC, each, with default stipulation. For the offence under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years and to pay a fine of ? 3,000/- (Rupees three thousand) only, and default clause of imprisonment. All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently setting off the period of incarceration undergone during investigation and trial.

3. Learned Counsel for the Appellant before this Court contended that, the FIR was lodged after a delay of ten days from the date of the alleged incident with the delay remaining unexplained. The person who scribed the FIR Exhibit 2, one Nanda Lal Limboo was not examined as a Prosecution witness, therefore, the FIR remained unproved. The signature of the Complainant on Exhibit 2 was not proved and the procedure prescribed under Section 154 of the Cr.P.C. for filing an FIR was not followed. The age of the victim has not been established as Exhibit 7 the Birth Certificate was not proved. Consequently, the case of the Prosecution fails and the Appellant ought to be acquitted.

4. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor per contra submitted that in Ash Bahadur Subba vs. State of Sikkim, 2022 SCC OnLine Sikk 42 this Court has held that the FIR is not substantive evidence and that even if the FIR is not proved, it would not be a ground for acquittal as the case would depend upon the weight of the Prosecution evidence. The delay in lodging the FIR was due to the fact that the wife of PW-2, the mother of the victim