( 1 ) PRESENT second appeal has been preferred assailing the judgment and decree dated 15-4-1977 passed by Lower Appellate Court whereby Civil Appeal No. 92 of 1976 was allowed and judgment a decree dated 25-3-1976 passed by trial court was reversed.

( 2 ) PLAINTIFFS instituted suit No. 62 of 1971 with the impetratory relief of permanent injunction restraining defendants from interfering with their possession over the land marked by letters Cha, Chha, Ja and Jha in the plaint map and also for closing northern door enumerated therein attended with further relief to restrain them to have ingress and egress through Sahan shown by letters ba, Ya, Ra, and Sa on the ground that the land in suit was their own property which descended to them from their ancestors and further that the defendants had no right to interfere with the possession of plaintiffs. Defendants on the other hand repudiated plaint allegations in the written statement alleging that both the parties descend from common ancestors and that plaintiffs case as contained in the plaint is wholly wrong. It was further averred by the defendants that they were owners of part of the land as indicated in the written statement and lastly it was claimed that the suit is liable to be dismissed.

( 3 ) THE Court while admitting the appeal, gleaned following questions of law for determination, which are abstracted below. 1. Whether the impugned judgment of first appellate court is no judgment in the eye of law inasmuch as the same is in utter disregard and violation of Order 41, Rule 31 of c. P. C. ? 2. Whether the first appellate court was justified in dismissing the suit on the theory of partition in the family whereas the defendants failed to adduce any evidence to the effect that the family was common and joint; that the land in question was the ancestral property of the family aria the same was acted upon by all the parties? 3. Whether the first appellate court erred in law in basing its judgment solely on the civil Court Amins report (22-C) and the map (23-C), which was not proved in accordance with law and without production of aforesaid Amin as a witness in the evidence?

( 4 ) HEARD Sri D. P. Singh, appearing for the appellants. There is no appearance for the respondents notwithstanding the fact that case was called out in revised list.

( 5 ) SRI. D. P. Singh appearing for the appellants strenuously argued that the judgment rendered by lower appellate court falls short of the requirements of a judgment as envisaged in Order 41, Rule 31 C. P. C. inasmuch as the lower appellate court has not framed any specific point for determination and has omitted to give decision on points which were of pivotal importance and had material bearing on the controversy involved in the case. In aid of his arguments, the learned counsel relied upon a decision in Suraj Singh v. Sohan Lal, air 1981 All 330.

( 6 ) IT would appear from the arguments advanced across the bar that mainstay of the argument of the learned counsel is Order 41, Rule 31 C. P. C. the requirements of which according to the learned counsel are conspicuously wanting in the judgment of the lower appellate court. Order 41, Rule 31 c. P. C. which have been extensively quoted by the learned counsel in the course of arguments may be excerpted below. "31. Contents, date and signature of judgment - The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state - (a) the points for determinatiqn;. (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled, and shall at the time that it. is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the judges concurring therein. "from a punctilious reading of the provisions aforestated, it does appear that the underlying object of the Legislature in making incumbent on the appellate court the framing of points for determination is to be to clear up the pleadings and focus the atten

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