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1997 Supreme(All) 632
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
P. K. Jain, J.
DIVISIONAL SUPERINTENDENT, NORTHERN RAILWAY - Appellant
Versus
SECOND ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE - Respondents
C. M. W. P. 5045 Of 1980
Decided On : 05/28/1997
S.D.Mandhyan
The power of review under Order 47, Rule 1, C. P. C. is not an appeal in disguise and cannot be exercised on the ground that the earlier decision was erroneous on merit or where a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions.
Headnote:
PAYMENT OF WAGES ACT - SECTION 17 - REVIEW - JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT - REVIEW POWERS UNDER ORDER 47, RULE 1, C. P. C. - SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS - REVIEW NOT AN APPEAL IN DISGUISE - ERROR APPARENT ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD - MEANING AND SCOPE.
Fact of the Case:
Respondent No. 2 moved an application under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act before the prescribed authority, who allowed the claim of Respondent No. 2 to the extent of Rs. 2108.58 as wages and Rs. 250/- as compensation. Respondent No. 2 preferred an appeal, which was dismissed by the First Addl. District Judge, Allahabad, affirming the order of the prescribed authority. Respondent No. 2 then moved an application for review under Order XLVII, Rule 1, C. P. C., which was allowed by the 2nd Addl. District Judge, Allahabad, who enhanced the amount of compensation from Rs. 250/- to Rs. 1250/-.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the appellate Court under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act is an ordinary Court under the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, its orders and decrees are governed by the rules of the Civil Procedure Code. Consequently, a review is competent against the decision of the District Judge passed in an appeal under Section 17 of the Act. However, the Court also held that the reviewing Court overstepped its jurisdiction by modifying the order of the appellate Court by exercising review powers, as the review powers cannot be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merit or where a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions.
Issues: 1. Whether the appellate Court under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act is an ordinary Court under the Code of Civil Procedure? 2. Whether a review is competent against the decision of the District Judge passed in an appeal under Section 17 of the Act? 3. Whether the reviewing Court can modify the order of the appellate Court by exercising review powers?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court held that the appellate Court under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act is an ordinary Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, as the statute creating the appellate jurisdiction of the District Judge under Section 17 of the Act does not confer any special jurisdiction on the Court, and the Court exercises all the powers of a Civil Court provided in the Code of Civil Procedure while hearing an appeal under Section 17 of the Act. 2. The Court held that a review is competent against the decision of the District Judge passed in an appeal under Section 17 of the Act, as the appellate Court under Section 17 of the Act is an ordinary Court under the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, its orders and decrees are governed by the rules of the Civil Procedure Code, which include the provisions for review under Order XLVII, Rule 1, C. P. C. 3. The Court held that the reviewing Court cannot modify the order of the appellate Court by exercising review powers, as the review powers under Order 47, Rule 1, C. P. C. are limited to cases where there is discovery of new and important matters or evidence, mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason, and cannot be exercised on the ground that the earlier decision was erroneous on merit or that a different view was possible than the one taken in the earlier decision.
Final Decision: The Court allowed the petition and quashed the impugned order passed on the review application, holding that the reviewing Court overstepped its jurisdiction by modifying the order of the appellate Court by exercising review powers.
( 1 ) HEARD counsel for the parties.
( 2 ) BY the present writ petition, the petitioner prays for quashing the order dated March 22, 1980 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) whereby the review petition was allowed by Respondent No. 1.
( 3 ) RESPONDENT No. 2 moved an application under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act (hereinafter called as the Act) before the prescribed authority. The learned prescribed authority allowed the claim of Respondent No. 2 to the extent of Rs. 2108. 58 as wages and Rs. 250/- as compensation. Respondent No. 2 preferred Misc. Civil Appeal No. 802 of 1977 which was heard and dismissed by the First Addl. District Judge, Allahabad vide judgment and order dated february 2, 1978 and the order of the prescribed authority was affirmed, Thereafter, Respondent no. 2 moved an application under Order XLVII, Rule 1, C. P. C. for reviewing the order so far as it related to the award of compensation. The learned 2nd Addl. District Judge, Allahabad who heard the review application allowed the same vide judgment and order dated March 22, 1980 and enhanced the amount of compensation from Rs. 250/- to Rs. 1250/ -. The order passed on review application is assailed mainly on the grounds that while exercising power under Section 17 of the Act the appellate Court did not act as a Civil Court and there being no other provisions in the Payment of Wages Act conferring powers of review upon the appellate authority the impugned order was without jurisdiction and that the reviewing authority has overstepped its jurisdiction by reassessing the evidence and by forming a different opinion than the one formed by his predecessor. Learned counsel for the respondents contends that the appellate powers nave been conferred upon Distt. Judge who hears the appeal in the capacity as District Judge and not as persona designata. Therefore, the District Judge as an Appellate Court under the Code of Civil procedure has power to review its decision. It is further contended that the appellate Court while disposing of the appeal vide judgment and order, dated February 2, 1978 tailed to consider some evidence which was an error of application on the face of record and, therefore, the review application was rightly entertained by the Successor and was rightly allowed by the impugned judgment and order.
( 4 ) SECTION 17 of the Payment of Wages Act provides that the parry aggrieved by the order of the prescribed authority on an application under Section 15 of the said Act may prefer an appeal to the District Judge. On a plain reading of this Section it would appear that ordinary appellate jurisdiction of the District Judge under the Code of Civil Procedure had been extended by the provisions of Section 17 of the Act. Therefore, the Court of the District Judge to whom an appeal is preferred under Section 17 of the Act will remain ordinary Court under the Code of Civil procedure. While hearing an appeal under Section 17 of the Act the District Judge acts as a Civil court and exercises all the powers of the Civil Court provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.
( 5 ) THERE is a catena of judicial pronouncements to support the view taken by me. In National sewing Thread Co. Ltd. v. James Chadwick and Bros, Ltd. AIR 1953 SC 357 their Lordships while considering the appellate powers of the High Court under the Trade Marks Act approved the view taken in 1913 AC 546 and observed that the statute created the Registrar a Tribunal for safeguarding these rights and for giving effect to the rights created by the Act, and the High court as such without more has been given appellate jurisdiction over ; the decision of this tribunal. It is not easy to understand on what grounds it can be said that the High Court while exercising this appellate jurisdiction has to exercise it in a manner different from its other appellate jurisdiction. It seems to us that this is merely an addition of a new subject-matter of appeal to the appellate jurisdiction alrea
