The legal point established is that in a partnership at will, a partner has the right to dissolve the firm, and the court has the jurisdiction to pass interim orders under Section 9 of the 1996 Act.

( 1 ) INSTANT First Appeal From Order has been filed under Section 37 (1) (a) of Arbitration and conciliation Act. 1996. [hereinafter referred to as the 1996 Act ). It is directed against judgment and order dated 19. 2. 2001 passed in Arbitration Case No. 3 of 2001 filed under Section 9 of the 1996 Act. By the impugned order, the District Judge, Varanasi has allowed the application and has restrained the appellants from carrying on business of dissolved firm in the name and style m/s. Kanhaiya Swaran Kala Kendra with its assets and using goodwill. By the impugned order, the Arbitrator appointed by the parties was also appointed Receiver to prepare inventory of the assets and stocks of the aforesaid firm. The Receiver was also directed to take the account books of the firm in his custody and to transact further business of the firm only if it is necessary for the winding up of the affairs of the firm. It was also ordered that Arbitrator will decide the dispute regarding damages, etc. which have been claimed when he decides the disputes and gives his award.

( 2 ) SRI T. P. Singh, learned counsel of the appellants and Dr. R. G. Padia, learned counsel for the respondent have been heard.

( 3 ) M/s. Kanhaiya Swam Kala Kendra is a registered partnership firm. The four appellants and the respondents are partners therein. A deed of partnership was executed on 7. 11. 1983 Incorporating the terms and conditions of the partnership. The partnership deed provides that in case any dispute arises amongst the partners, the same shall be referred to sole Arbitrator. According to the plaintiff-respondent, the entire amount of profit which came to his share was not paid to him, that the firm took loans at higher rate of interest, that the appellant has manipulated the account books of the firm and that the appellants withdrew the money from the firm which was in excess in proportion to the amount paid to the plaintiff-respondent. The plaintiff-respondent, therefore. dissolved the firm with effect from 1. 8. 2000 by sending notice to the appellants on 20. 7. 2000.

( 4 ) TWO points arise for consideration in this appeal : (i) Whether the plaintiff-respondent has right to dissolve the firm? (ii) Whether the Court has jurisdiction to pass interim order under Section 9 of the 1996 Act?

( 5 ) CLAUSE 4 of the deed of partnership provides as follows : "partnership business has been started with effect from 4th day of November. 1983 and shall be at will.

( 6 ) APART from the above recital in the deed. Clause 7 of the registration certificate. Annexure-C. A. 5, mentions the duration of the firm at will. Section 7 of the Indian Partnership act. 1932, (hereinafter referred to as the Act] defines partnership at will as follows :

"where no provision is made by contract between the partners for the duration of their partnership, or for the determination of their partnership, the partnership is "partnership at will".

( 7 ) SECTION 43 of the Act gives statutory right to a partner to dissolve that partnership at will, which provides as follows :

"dissolution by notice of partnership at will.--Where the partnership is at will, the firm may be dissolved by any partner giving notice in writing to all the other partners of his Intention to dissolve the firm. "

(2) The firm is dissolved as from the date mentioned in the notice as the date of dissolution or, if no date is so mentioned, as from the date of the communication of the notice.

( 8 ) A perusal of Section 7 of the Act makes it clear that if the contract between the partners does not provide for duration and determination of their partnership, the partnership is "partnership at will. " In the case of Ram Singh v. Ram Chand, AIR 1924 PC 2, the Privy Council has laid down that in a "partnership at will a partner is, as a matter of legal right, entitled to dissolution and relief cannot be refused even though he might have been guilty of misconduct. The appellants have relied upon the case of M. O