( 1 ) I agree with brother Dwivedi that Mr. Justice Jagdish Sahai rightly exercised the discretion of nor granting relief to the appellant in exercise of his extraordinary jurisdiction on the ground that an alternative adequate remedy was open to it and it had failed to avail itself of it.

( 2 ) RULE 6 of Ch. XXII of Rules of Court prima facie appears to be ultra vires the Court, but the matter was not discussed at the Bar and I do not give any definite opinion.

( 3 ) I do not agree with the contention of Sri Gopal Behari that Jagdish Sahai, J. ought not to have dismissed the petition summarily when it raised some questions of importance. Even when a statute expressly grants a power to dismiss an application summarily it does not take it away when the application raises important questions it law Even an important question can be decided correctly and if the High Court finds that important questions that arose before an inferior Tribunal were decided by it correctly it is not compelled to entertain the petition for certiorari or mandamus against the inferior Court and to give notice of it. No useful purpose will be served by its entertaining the petition and giving notice of it. If Jagdish Sahai, I heard the applicants counsel in full it became irrelevant whether the questions raised by him were important or not there was nothing to prevent his deciding them there and then.

( 4 ) WHETHER the alternative remedy open to the appellant was inadequate because of certain onerous conditions attached to its being availed of raised the question of fact whether the conditions were onerous or not. Attachment of any condition to the exercise of the alternative remedy did not as a matter of law render it inadequate. No facts were alleged by the appellant in its petition proving that the conditions in its case were so onerous as to make the remedy practically not available.

( 5 ) I agree that the appeal be dismissed with costs. J. N. Takru, J.

( 6 ) I agree with My Lord the Chiet Justice and brother Dwivedi, that this appeal should be dismissed with costs. Dwivedi, J.

( 7 ) THE Tax Officer of the Antarim Zila Parishad, Muzaffarnagar, levied a sum of Rs. 2,000/- as tax on circumstance and property on the appellant for the assessment year 1959-60. The tax was levied under the provisions of the U. P. District Boards Act, 1922 (hereinbelow called the Act ). The appellant moved a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the levy. Our brother, Jagdish Sahai, before whom the petition was moved, dismissed it summarily. He is of opinion that as the appellant had an adequate alternative remedy of appeal under Section 128 of the Act from the levy, the Court should not intercede.

( 8 ) WE are called upon to decide only one question in this appeal. That question is; should we upset the exercise of discretion by our brother?

( 9 ) A Court of appeal would not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Court below, if the discretion has been exercised in good faith-after giving due weight to relevant matters and without being swayed by irrelevant matters. It two views are possible on the question, then also the Court of appeal would not interfere, even though it may exercise discretion differently, were the case to come initially before it. The exercise of discretion should manifestly be wrong.

( 10 ) THE appellant has not urged that the discretion has been exercised mala fide or on irrelevant considerations We have only to decide whether it has been exercised without regard to relevant matters The impugned levy has been made under Section 114 of the Act read with a rule made by the Government which fixes the tax ceiling at Rs 2,000/- Section 114 provides that the tax may be imposed on any person residing or carrying on business in the rural area provided that such person has so resided or carried on business for at least six months in the assessment year. Section 128 provides for an appeal from the assessment to the Distri