( 1 ) THE arguments advanced by parties learned counsel on the import of the provisions contained in S. 156 (3) read with other relevant provisions certainly touched great heights but luckily the timely ushering of a decision of theapex Court has perforce reduced the controversies raised to a manageable extent.

( 2 ) IT so happened that a Division Bench (of two of us, P. Basu and Hon. ble J. C. Gupta, J.) came across in the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India of Ram Babu Gupta and Pramod Kumar Gupta an order dated 5-6-2000 (Annexure-6) passed in exercise of powers under S. 156 (3), Cr. P. C. by the Special Judge Dacoity Affected Area, Mainpuri directing Station Officer to register a case and investigate. The prayer was that the said order be quashed and respondents-Police Station Alau, Mainpuri and the informant Ved Prakash Dubey be restrained from arresting the petitioners in case Crime No. 900 of 2000, under S. 395 registered there in pursuance of the impugned order.

( 3 ) SHRI J. S. Audichya, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the application of Ved Prakash Dubey requested the Magistrate to exercise only his powers under S. 156 (3), Cr. P. C. , direct the police to register the F. I. R. and, investigate it. The argument proceeded that the Special Judges order "s. O. Alau ko Nirdesh Diya jata hai ki mukaddamma darj kar vivechna karen" (Translation by Court :"the S. O. is directed to register the case and investigate. ") does not indicate application of mind, there was no power with the Magistrate to direct the registration of the case; since there was no complaint within the meaning of S. 2 of Cr. P. C. the aforesaid order could not have been passed in exercise of the powers under S. 156 (3), Cr. P. C. Reliance was placed on the decision of a Division Bench in Suraj Mal (1993) 30 All Cri C 81.

( 4 ) IN a couple of days twenty petitions came to be filed with more or less similar prayers and in each matter it was noticed that either the challenge was to the Magistrate exercising powers under S. 156 (3), Cr. P. C. because there was no proper complaint or because there was nothing in the order which showed application of mind by the Court before directing police station to register and investigate the case. Every time learned counsel came up with various decisions of this Court as well as other Courts, some of single Judge and some of Division Bench on the question of existence or non-existence of the power with the Magistrate to direct the police to register an F. I. R. with the police station. Some decisions also were cited indicating necessity of passing some such order as to indicate application of mind rather than only say "register and investigate. "

( 5 ) ALL the matters which came before the said Division Bench were clubbed together in a bunch, notices were issued to the respondents, counter-affidavits were called and the proceedings were stayed. Simultaneously, the matter was referred to a larger Bench. The reason for the reference was that the Division Bench in Suraj Mal (1993 (30) All Cri C 81) (supra) took the view that where an application is moved before a Magistrate requesting only exercise of powers under S. 156 (3), Cr. P. C. , it could not be termed as a "complaint" within the meaning of S. 2 of Cr. P. C. The relevant portion of the judgment in Suraj Mal is quoted below :-"a perusal of the application moved by respondent No. 2 clearly shows that his grievance before the learned Magistrate was against the police as on being approached his report was not recorded under S. 154 of the Code. After stating the injustice caused to him he prayed before the learned Magistrate that police be directed to register his case and investigate the same. The contention of the learned counsel for petitioners that the application moved by respondent No. 2 was a complaint thus is not correct. As it was not a complaint, there was no occasion for the learned Magistrate to adopt the procedure