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2000 Supreme(All) 754

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
D. K. Seth, J.
LILANAND THAKUR PAGAL BABA TRUST PRABANDH SAMITI - Appellant
Versus
THAKUR RADHA GOVINDJI MAHARAJ VRINDABAN AND OTHERS - Respondents
Civil Revision 335 Of 1999
Decided On : 05/18/2000

Advocates Appeared:
Janardan Sahai, R.N.SHARMA, V.K.BARMAN

The grant of leave under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code only permits the institution of the suit and does not imply anything more than permission to institute the suit. The trial of the suit is prohibited under Section 38 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, but not the institution thereof. The grant of leave does not amount to a case decided within the meaning of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Headnote:

Section 92 - Jurisdiction of District Judge - Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 - [Section 92] - [Section 38 of Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887] - The court discussed the interpretation of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code and Section 38 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. It emphasized that the grant of leave under Section 92 only permits the institution of the suit and does not imply anything more than permission to institute the suit. The court also highlighted that the trial of the suit is prohibited under Section 38, but not the institution thereof. It further clarified that the grant of leave is subject to revocation on merit if any party points out grounds for revocation, and the court is bound to decide the same on merit. The judgment also emphasized that the grant of leave does not amount to a case decided within the meaning of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Fact of the Case:

Two suits were instituted seeking leave under Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. The petitioner challenged the grant of leave in both suits, contending that the District Judge was a party in one suit and personally interested in the trust property involved in the other suit, making the grant of leave without jurisdiction.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the grant of leave under Section 92 only permits the institution of the suit and does not imply anything more than permission to institute the suit. It also emphasized that the trial of the suit is prohibited under Section 38 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, but not the institution thereof. The court further held that the grant of leave does not amount to a case decided within the meaning of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Issues: The issues revolved around the jurisdiction of the District Judge to grant leave under Section 92, the interpretation of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code, and the applicability of Section 38 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887.

Ratio Decidendi: The court clarified that the grant of leave under Section 92 only permits the institution of the suit and does not imply anything more than permission to institute the suit. It also emphasized that the trial of the suit is prohibited under Section 38 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, but not the institution thereof. The court further held that the grant of leave does not amount to a case decided within the meaning of Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code.

Final Decision: Both the revision applications were dismissed, and there was no order as to costs.

D. K. SETH, J.


( 1 ) TWO suits were Instituted seeking the leave under Section 92 of C. P. C. In one of the suits, being Original Suit No. 2 of 1999, the learned District Judge, Mathura was one of the party, namely, defendant No. 9 filed in respect of the property of the Trust of Sri Lilanand Thakur pagal Baba Trust Vrindavan, with regard to the temple. in the other suit, being Original Suit No, 5 of 1999 relating to the Management of the property of the Hospital of Sri Lilanand Thakur pagal Baba, the District Judge was not made a defendant. In both the suits, applications for grant of leave have been filed before the learned District Judge who had granted the leave.

( 2 ) IT is contened that the District Judge has also granted injunction and the said order was challenged before this Court and the order of injunction was set aside by this Court in F. A. F. O. No. by an order dated. The petitioner as one of the defendent in suit has filed an application for transfer before this Court under Section 24 of the C. P. C. being transfer application No. which was disposed of on by this Court.

( 3 ) NOW Mr. R. N. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner in these revisions, has challenged the grant of the leave in both the suits, on the ground that in Original Suit No. 2 of 1999 the district Judge was a party and as such he could not try the suit under Section 38 of Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887. Since the trusts were created by one person, therefore, according to him, learned District Judge was also interested in the trust property involved in original Suit No. 5 of 1999 as such he could not try that suit also. Therefore, the grant of leave is wholly without jurisdiction and hit by Section 38 of the said Act and as such, the leave should be revoked. He also relied on the decision in the case of Ram Kishore Sharma. and others a. Gopi nath and others. 1979 AWC 393, in support of his contention.

( 4 ) MR. V. K. Barman, learned counsel for the opposite parties, on the other hand, contended that since the suits had been transferred to Agra from Mathura, the question cannot be raised in the grant of leave. He further contended that the injunction that was granted by the learned District judge, having been vacated by this Court in the appeal, the question has now become academic. He then contended that Section 38 prohibits the trial of suit but not the Institution thereof. He then contended that the District Judge was a defendant in one of the suits, who had granted leave, as against him as well as granted injunction which has also affected him, therefore it cannot be said that he had acted according to his Interest. He has also relied on a decision of R m. Narayana Chettiar and another v. N. Lakshmanan Chettiar and others, AIR 1991 SC 221. He further contended that the grant of leave is not absolute since it was granted without notice. It is still open to the parties aggrieved to apply for revocation of leave before the Court on any ground concerning the merit with regard to grant of leave. If such application is made, the Court is bound to decide the same on merit. Further according to him no prejudice or injury will be caused to the petitioner if the orders allowing the leave in two suits come within the meaning under Section 115 of C. P. C. Therefore, these revisions are not maintainable.


( 5 ) I have heard both the learned counsel at length. Section 38 of Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil courts Act, 1887, provides that the Presiding Officer of a civil court shall not try any suit or other proceeding to which he is a party or in which he is personally Interested. The expression used in the Section "shall not try* means the trial of the suit. This does not prohibit institution of the suit. By reading Section 92. C. P. C. , it appears that a suit can be instituted with regard to the matter referred to under Section 92 only with the leave of the Court. Therefore, a suit covered section 92 can be deemed to be instituted only whe







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