YASHODA NANDAN J. :- These two connected appeals have been referred to a larger Bench by a learned single Judge because he found himself unable to agree with the decision of one of us in Civil Revn. No. 1135 of 1976 (Triloki Nath v. Sri Tula Ram decided on 21st December, 1976). In both these appeals identical question of law arises for consideration.

2. The material facts giving rise to these appeals are that the plaintiff respondents after obtaining requisite sanction of the Advocate General of the State filed a suit under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure -hereinafter referred to as the Code-against the appellants in the court of the Dist. Judge, Bareilly. The suit was transferred for decision to the Third Additional District Judge, Bareilly, who decided it ex parte on the 11th February. 1976. The appellants applied for setting aside of the ex parte decree but the application was dismissed. Against the dismissal of the application for the setting aside of the decree the appellants have preferred First Appeal From Order No. 93 of 1977. In the suit certain issues were decided by the Additional District Judge as preliminary issues. The issues having been decided against the defendants, they have preferred First Appeal From Order No. 45 of 1976 challenging the findings on those issues.

3. When the appeals came up for hearing before a learned single Judge. It was urged before him that a suit under S.92 of the Code could be instituted before and decided only by the District Judge who constituted the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction and the Additional District Judge consequently acted without jurisdiction in passing the ex parte decree and deciding the preliminary issues. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-opposite parties appears to have countered the contention by placing reliance on the decision of this Court in Triloki Nath v. Sri Tula Ram, (Civil Revn. No. 1135 of 1976, D/-21-12-1976) (supra). If the view taken in the above-mentioned decision is correct, the contention raised on behalf of the appellants must prevail.

4. In Triloki Naths case it was observed that S.92 required the institution of a suit under that provision in the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in the alternative in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government. It was held that,

"This reservation of the power of specifically empowering another Court would be set at naught if the District Judge transfers under S.24, C.P.C. a case instituted in his Court under S.92, C.P.C. The reservation in favour of the State Government to specifically empower another Court to receive suits under S.92 does, in my opinion, imply a restriction on the power of transfer possessed by the District Judge under S.24, C.P.C."

In support of the view, reliance was placed on the decisions of the Bombay High Court in Dhoribhai Dadabhai v. Pragdasji Bhagwandasji, (AIR 1935 Bom 172) and the Calcutta High Court in Muhammad Musa v. Abdul Hassan Khan, (AIR 1914 Cal 616).

5. According to S.4(12) of the General Clauses Act, "District Judge" is "the Judge of the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction." Section 8 of the Bengal. Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887 (Act XII of 1887) provides :

"Additional Judges - (1) When the business pending before any District Judge requires the aid of Additional Judges for its speedy disposal, the State Government may, having consulted the High Court appoint such Additional Judges as may be requisite.

(2) Additional Judges so appointed shall discharge any of the functions of a District Judge which the District Judge may assign to them, and in the discharge of those functions they shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge."

Under S.24(1)(a) of the Code, the District Court is empowered at any stage to "transfer any suit, appeal or other proceedings pending before it for trial or disposal to any Court subordinate to it and competent to try and dispose of the same." For the purposes of S.