The main legal point established in the judgment is the importance of judicial discipline and the binding nature of Full Bench judgments, emphasizing that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued in the absence of non-performance of any statutory duty and that the High Court cannot examine the legality or propriety of an order passed by a civil court, except in rarest of rare cases.

( 1 ) A learned single Judge, vide his order dated 6. 5. 1999, opined that in view of the Full Bench judgment (delivered by Honble Mr. Justice B. P. Jeevan Reddy, C. J. , Honble Mr. Justice V. N. Khare and Honble Mr. Justice V. N. Mehrotra, the first two have been elevated to the Honble supreme Court) in Ganga Saran v. Civil Judge. Hapur and others, 1991 ACJ 186 : 1991 (1)AWC 213, this writ petition filed for quashing the order passed by the Civil Judge (Junior division), Varanasi, refusing to grant interim injunction in favour of the petitioner and that part of the appellate order passed by the Additional District Judge, Varanasi, affirming the same, is not maintainable, but as the learned counsel for the writ petitioner relied upon a single Judge judgment of this Court in Ram Singh v. Special Judge and others, 1992 (Supp 2) RD 362, which, relying upon Dwarika Nath v. Income Tax Officer, AIR 1966 SC 81 and M. V. Elisabeth and others v. Harman Investment and Trading Pvt. Ltd. , JT 1992 (2) SC 65, had explained away the full Bench decision. He further opined that the said decision is contrary to the Full Bench decision and referred the matter to a larger Bench for reconsideration of the decision of the learned single Judge. The Honble Chief Justice, vide his order dated 31. 8. 1999 directed placing this case before a Bench presided over by one of us (Binod Kumar Roy, J.), that is how this case has been placed before us.

( 2 ) THE following two questions were formulated for adjudication by the three Judges Full Bench of this Court in Ganga Saran (supra) :

" (1) Whether the judgment of the Supreme Court in Qamaruddin v. Rasul Baksh, 1990 AWC 308, has the effect of overruling the Full Bench decision of this Court in Jupitor Chit Fund (P.)Ltd. v. Dwarka Diesh, AIR 1979 All 218, as affirmed by the judgment of the Supreme Court in vishesh Kumar v. Shanti Prasad, AIR 1980 SC 892 and Sri Vishnu Awatar v. Shiv Awatar, AIR sc 1575.

(2) Whether a writ lies against a civil courts decision? in short whether an appellate order passed by the District Judge or an order passed by it in exercise of its revisionary power conferred upon it by Section 115, C. P. C. (as amended by U. P. Amendment Act, 1978) is amenable to writ jurisdiction of this Court?"

2. 1. The Full Bench answered Question No. 1 in negative and Question No. 2 in affirmative only to this extent that where it is found from the order impugned that fundamental principle of law has been violated and further such an order causes substantial injustice to the party aggrieved, the principle that ordinarily interlocutory order passed in the civil suit is not amenable to extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court, will not preclude such a writ petition being issued by the High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution within the ambit of well-established and recognised principles laid down by the Supreme Court.

2. 2. While recording its answer to Question No. 2, the Full Bench in paragraph 11 of its judgment had observed as follows : "with respect to second question to be answered by us, we are not inclined to deal it elaborately here. Suffice it to say that the view of the Supreme Court in Qamaruddins case (supra) that ordinarily an interlocutory order passed in civil suit is not amenable to extraordinary jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, no doubt is based upon recognised principle taken into consideration by the Court in refusing the writ. In our opinion, this view of the supreme Court in Qamaruddins case is based on assumption that a revision under Section 115, c. P. C. to High Court is maintainable and the party aggrieved can invoke revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. But in a situation where a revision is barred against the appellate or revisional order passed by the district courts and the said order suffers from apparent error of law and further causes manifest injustice to the party aggrieved, can it be