An employee who is promoted on a local stop gap arrangement for a limited period cannot claim a right to continue in the promoted post after the expiry of the period, even if the promotion is extended for consecutive periods.

( 1 ) THE petitioner was promoted to the post of Assistant Development Officer temporarily as local stop gap arrangement for a period of 89 days only. The said promotion order itself indicated that it was by way of local stop gap arrangement and that the promotion was purely temporary limited for a period of 89 days. It also stipulated that on the expiry of the limited period, the petitioner will be automatically reverted without any notice and that he will not be entitled to claim any benefit on account thereof. However, on the same terms, the said promotion was being extended for 89 days consecutively for quite some time right from 25th August, 1990 till 30th september, 1994. The last order of extension was issued on the same terms for a period of 89 days with a condition that as soon as 89 days would be over, the petitioner would be automatically reverted without any notice to his original post and that he would not be entitled to claim any right on account of such temporary promotion. By the impugned order dated 3. 10. 1994 contained in Annexure-13 to the writ petition, the said fact was intimated to the office of Chief Development Authority with an instruction that on the expiry of said period of 89 days, by virtue of the terms contained in the order of promotion and extension thereof, the petitioner would stand reverted (o his original post and that he may be adjusted after obtaining instructions from the District Development Authority, Etawah. This order has since been challenged in this writ petition.

( 2 ) MR. H. N. Tripathi. learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the order of reversion has been passed by the District Assistant Registrar whereas the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative societies. U. P. . Agra, is the petitioners appointing authority and therefore the said order contained in Annexure-13 is wholly without jurisdiction. In support of his contention, Mr. Tripathi had relied on the decision in the case of Kuldip Chand Sharma v. Delhi Administration, 1978 AISLJ 461 in order to contend that ad hoc appointee can be reverted to his original post only for some valid reasons. Mr. Tripathi contends that the ratio decided In the said case, clearly fits in the facts and circumstances of the present case, therefore, the impugned order of reversion cannot be sustained. He further contends that the impugned order of reversion contained in annexure-13 to the writ petition having been passed by an authority which is not the petitioners appointing authority, is void ab initio.

( 3 ) 1 have heard Mr. Tripathi, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned standing counsel at length.

( 4 ) IT appears that the appointment was made purely as local stop gap arrangement on temporary basis for a limited, period, with a stipulation therein that upon expiry of the limited period, the petitioner would be deemed to have been reverted to his original post and that he will not be entitled to claim any right in respect of such limited promotion. The said promotion was extended from time to time and every time same conditions were repeated. Admittedly, after 30th September, 1994, there was no extension given. Mr. Tripathi has not been able to show anything either from the pleadings or from the annexures that after 30th September, 1994. there was any further extension. Since the promotion was limited by time and the order having contained specific stipulation that the petitioner would be automatically reverted with the expiry of the limited period, the petitioner cannot claim any right after such limited period has expired. In the absence of any extension given to the petitioners appointment after 30th September 1994. the petitioner cannot continue on the said post. The very expression used in the order itself shows about the consequence on account of non-extension of the order, there is no scope for the petitioner to claim any right over the same. In the case of State of U. P. v. Kaushal Kishore shukla, 1991 SCC 691