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1993 Supreme(All) 67

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
V. N. Khare, B. M. Lal and A. P. Misra, JJ.
HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD - Appellant
Versus
AMOD KUMAR SRIVASTAVA - Respondents
Spl. Appeal 120 Of 1992
Decided On : 01/28/1993

Advocates Appeared:
S.C.BUDHWAR, Sapru Bharti, SUDHIR CHAND

The administrative wing of the High Court is not an industry within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, and the State Legislature cannot make a law abrogating the power of the Chief Justice to terminate the services of employees of the High Court.

Headnote:

U. P. INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT - APPLICABILITY TO HIGH COURT EMPLOYEES - WHETHER HIGH COURT IS AN INDUSTRY - WHETHER ADMINISTRATIVE WING OF HIGH COURT IS SEVERABLE FROM JUDICIAL WING - WHETHER FUNCTIONS OF HIGH COURT EMPLOYEES CONSTITUTE INDUSTRY - WHETHER STATE LEGISLATURE CAN MAKE LAW ABROGATING POWER OF CHIEF JUSTICE TO TERMINATE SERVICES OF EMPLOYEES - INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 229 OF THE CONSTITUTION.

Fact of the Case:

The respondents, who were appointed as Routine Grade Assistants on an ad hoc basis in the Allahabad High Court, were terminated from service. They filed a writ petition challenging the termination, arguing that the administrative wing of the High Court is an industry within the meaning of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and that their termination was in violation of Section 6-N of the Act.

Finding of the Court:

The Court held that the High Court is not divisible into two separate wings, namely the judicial wing and the administrative wing, and that the administrative wing is not an industry within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. The Court further held that the State Legislature cannot make a law abrogating the power of the Chief Justice to terminate the services of employees of the High Court, as this power is implicit in the power of the Chief Justice to appoint officers and servants of the High Court under Article 229 of the Constitution.

Issues: 1. Whether the High Court is divisible into two separate wings, namely the judicial wing and the administrative wing? 2. Whether the administrative wing of the High Court is an industry within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act? 3. Whether the State Legislature can make a law abrogating the power of the Chief Justice to terminate the services of employees of the High Court?

Ratio Decidendi: 1. The High Court is not divisible into two separate wings, namely the judicial wing and the administrative wing, because the functions of the administrative wing are ancillary and supportive of the sovereign functions of the judicial wing. 2. The administrative wing of the High Court is not an industry within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act because it does not perform any economic or welfare activities unconnected with the function of dispensation of justice performed by the High Court. 3. The State Legislature cannot make a law abrogating the power of the Chief Justice to terminate the services of employees of the High Court because this power is implicit in the power of the Chief Justice to appoint officers and servants of the High Court under Article 229 of the Constitution.

Final Decision: The appeal was allowed, the order and judgment of the learned Single Judge was set aside, and the writ petition was dismissed.

V. N. KHARE, J.

( 1 ) THE main question which requires to be decided by this Full Bench in this Special Appeal arising out of judgment and order dated March 25, 1992 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court allowing the writ petition filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 32 against termination of their services as Routine Grade Assistants is as to "whether the administrative wing of the High Court not directly connected with the actual adjudication of the cases can be categorised as an industry within the meaning of Section 2 (k) of the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act. "

( 2 ) THE detailed facts of the case have been set-out in the judgment of the learned Single Judge and I need not repeat those facts to save the bulk. of this judgment However, I would briefly notice certain facts which led the respondents to file the writ petition under Article 226 of the constitution in this Court. On April 29, 1987 the then Honble the Chief Justice of High Court issued a direction to the effect that some Routine Grade Assistants may be appointed on ad hoc basis and appointments so made shall be purely contractual and will be terminable at any time without any notice. It was also directed that the candidates to be appointed as such shall be required to sign a contract to the said effect before their appointment. Subsequent thereto, with the approval of the then Honble the Chief Justice some candidates were engaged on daily wages basis. The appointment letters issued to the respondents inter alia stated that, the Court has been pleased to engage them on daily wages basis; that they will not be entitled to any wages for sundays and other holidays unless called for work; that their services can be dispensed with at any time without notice and that they will have no claim for substantive/regular appointment on any post in the office of the High Court. These letters were signed by the Registrar of the High court and the respondents were appointed on the aforesaid terms and conditions as Routine grade Assistants in the High Court. While they were working as Routine Grade Assistants regular exanimation for recruitment to the posts of Routine Grade Assistants was held. After the selected candidates became available and were issued letter of appointment, the services of respondents Nos. 1 to 32 were dispensed with as no longer required. It is at this stage that the respondents filed the writ petition and challenged the termination of their services.

( 3 ) BEFORE the learned Single Judge number of arguments were pressed but the learned Single judge allowed the writ petition inter alia on the ground that the High Court is divisible in two separate parts i. e. one, the judicial wing and other, the administrative wing, that the judicial wing which is entrusted with the function of dispensation of justice although exercises sovereign function but the administrative wing of the High Court is an industry for purposes of U. P. Industrial Disputes Act and that since the respondents have put in service for more than 240 days, the termination of their service is in violation of Section 6-N of the U. P. Industrial disputes Act, as no retrenchment compensations were paid to them before termination of their services. In view of the said findings, the writ petition was allowed and order passed by the registrar, High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dispensing with the services of the respondents was set aside.


( 4 ) WE have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. On the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, the questions which arise for considerations are: 1. Whether the High Court exercises regal or sovereign functions or it merely renders service to the people in discharge of its duties? 2. Whether the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is divisible in two separate parts namely the judicial side and other the administrative side? 3. Whether the administrative wing of the High Court which includes Class III and Class IV employees, fulfils the requ

















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