A stay order only makes a notification inoperative, but it does not wipe it out altogether. After the writ petitions are dismissed, the liability of the petitioners to pay additional charges revives with retrospective effect.

( 1 ) WHETHER petitioners, who are consumers of electricity, are liable to pay additional charges on the electricity dues, payment of which was not made on or before the due date in view of interim orders passed by this court in the writ petitions filed by them challenging the notification enhancing the electricity tariff rates, after the writ petitions have been dismissed is the question which is involved in these writ petitions and is required to be decided by this court.

( 2 ) PARTIES have exchanged affidavits. As in all these writ petitions the same question is involved they are being disposed of by one common judgment. With the consent to learned counsel for parties Writ Petition No. 10755 of 1993, M/s. Kanoria Chemicals and Industries Ltd. v. U. P. State Electricity Board, has been made the leading case.

( 3 ) PETITIONER in the leading case is a public limited company engaged in business of manufacturing caustic soda and allied chemicals in the district of Sonebhadra. By notification dated 21-4-1990 the U. P. State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) revised the electricity rates under S. 49 of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948. This notification was issued in supersession of all previous notifications, orders and instructions and existing rate schedules were substituted by rate schedule appended to new notification. It was further provided in clause 7 (b) of the notification, which is reproduced below, that in case the electricity dues are not paid by due date, the consumer shall be liable to pay additional charges:"7 (B) For delayed payment : in the event of any bill of whatever nature it may be not being paid by the due date specified therein, the consumer shall pay an additional charge per day of seven paise per hundred rupees or part thereof on the unpaid amount of the bill for the period by which the payment is delayed, beyond the due date specified in the bill, without prejudice to the right of the Board to disconnect the supply. "this notification was challenged before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by means of writ petition No. 19967 of 1990, by Eastern U. P. Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Allahabad and the petitioner in which the following interim order was passed :"meanwhile till 23-8-1990 unless recalled earlier, the operation of notification dt. 21-4-1990 shall remain stayed. The respondents are restrained from realising the additional amount of electric charges from petitioners in pursuance of the said notification. However, the petitioners shall continue to pay the old rate. "the interim order was for limited period but was extended from time to time by this court and remained in operation during the pendency of the writ petition. In some other writ petition different type of stay order was passed. As illustration interim order passed in writ petition No. 30097 of 1990, Employers Association of Northern India v. U. P. State Electricity Board is reproduced below:"meanwhile effect shall not be given to the notification dated 21/04/1990 as against the petitioners. However, it is made clear that in the event of failure of the writ petition the petitioners shall deposit with the relevant authority within a period of one month from the date of dismissal of the writ petition the difference between the amount of electricity dues, which will be paid hereinafter by the petitioners under our order and the sum which may be calculated on the basis of the impugned notification. "during the pendency of the writ petition the Board issued electricity bills to the petitioners according to the notification dated 21-4-1990, but in view of the interim orders passed by this court the petitioners paid the electricity dues according to the tariff rates which were enforced prior to the above notification. All these writ petitions were dismissed by a Division Bench of this court on 1-3-1993. After dismissal of the writ petitions the petitioners are said to have de