1985 Supreme(All) 224
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
B. L. YADAV
STATE - Appellant
Versus
PREM SINGH VAHI - Respondents
C. M. W. P. 13941 Of 1982
Decided On : 07/17/1985
Haji Iqbal Ahmad
The provisions of S. 2(q)(i) and (ii) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976, are not contradictory to the provisions of S. 4(9) of the Act. S. 4(9) applies even to one plot with a building and vacant land. The built-up area and land appurtenant are to be excluded first. If there is any surplus land, S. 4(9) will be attracted, and the built-up area and land appurtenant will be taken into account to determine whether the person holds vacant land beyond the ceiling limit.
Headnote:
URBAN LAND (CEILING AND REGULATIONS) ACT, 1976 - S. 2(q)(i), (ii), 4(9) - Interpretation - Provisions not contradictory - S. 4(9) applies even to one plot with building and vacant land - Built-up area and land appurtenant to be excluded first - Surplus land, if any, to be determined by considering built-up area and land appurtenant.
Fact of the Case:
Respondent filed a statement under S. 6(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976, declaring that he holds two residential houses and no area was liable to be declared surplus. The State contested, alleging that the land was correctly shown as surplus in the draft and final statements prepared under Ss. 8 and 9 of the Act. The Competent Authority declared an area of 27.60 sq. mtrs. as surplus land. Respondent's appeal was allowed by the District Judge, holding that the provisions of S. 2(q)(i) and (ii) of the Act were contradictory to the provisions of S. 4(9) of the Act.
Finding of the Court:
The District Judge erred in holding that the provisions of S. 2(q)(i) and (ii) of the Act were contradictory to the provisions of S. 4(9) of the Act. The provisions must be read together and interpreted harmoniously. S. 4(9) applies even to one plot with a building and vacant land. The built-up area and land appurtenant are to be excluded first. If there is any surplus land, S. 4(9) will be attracted, and the built-up area and land appurtenant will be taken into account to determine whether the person holds vacant land beyond the ceiling limit.
Issues: Whether the provisions of S. 2(q)(i) and (ii) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976, are contradictory to the provisions of S. 4(9) of the Act.
Ratio Decidendi: The provisions of S. 2(q)(i) and (ii) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976, are not contradictory to the provisions of S. 4(9) of the Act. The provisions must be read together and interpreted harmoniously. S. 4(9) applies even to one plot with a building and vacant land. The built-up area and land appurtenant are to be excluded first. If there is any surplus land, S. 4(9) will be attracted, and the built-up area and land appurtenant will be taken into account to determine whether the person holds vacant land beyond the ceiling limit.
Final Decision: The writ petition is allowed. The impugned order of the District Judge is quashed. The District Judge is directed to decide the case afresh in accordance with law and the observations made by the court.
( 1 ) THE present petition under Art. 126 of the Constitution is directed against the order dt. 1-9-82 passed in an appeal under S. 33 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulations) Act, 1976, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), by the District Judge, Gorakhpur.
( 2 ) THE facts of the case lie in a very narrow campass. The provisions of the Act were enforced in the area and respondent 1 filed his statement under S. 6 (1) of the Act stating that he holds an area of 167 sq. mtrs. in Mohalla Mohaddipur, District Gorakhpur and another area of 363. 87 sq. mtrs. He further alleged that he has an area of 1497 sq. mtrs. in Khasra No. 389. In short respondent 1 has got two houses owned by him and both are residential houses and no area was liable to be declared surplus.
( 3 ) THE State of U. P. contested the case of respondent 1 and it was alleged that the land of respondent 1 was correctly shown to be surplus in the draft statement prepared under S. 8 of the Act and the final statement was correctly prepared as contemplated by S. 9 of the Act.
( 4 ) THE Competent Authority by his order dt. 12-10-81 declared an area of 27. 60 sq. mtrs. as surplus land. Thereafter the appeal of respondent 1 was allowed by the impugned order dated 1-9-82.
( 5 ) SRI Ram Prasad Singh, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel appearing for the State urged that the District Judge erred in holding that the provisions of S. 2 (q) (i) and (ii) of the Act were contradictory to the provisions of S. 4 (9) of the Act. It is a fact that the District Judge has held in para 3 of the judgment, a certified copy of which has been filed as Annexure II, that both the provisions are contradictory to each other.
( 6 ) NO one has appeared on behalf of the respondents in spite of notices being issued and served on them. I have no option but to decide the case on the basis of the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner.
( 7 ) IT appears that the District Judge did not care to apply the correct and well-known principles of interpretation of statutes. In such a situation the basic principle was that the statute must have been read as a whole and not in peacemeal. In other words all the provisions contained in the Act must have been read together and thereafter efforts must have been made to reconcile the same by ascertaining the intention of the legislature. I think it necessary to refer to some of the decided cases relevant to the present controversy.
( 8 ) IN Att. General v. H. R. H. Prince Augustus, (1957) 1 All England Report 49 (HL), it was observed as follows:-"i conceive it to be my right and duty to examine every word of the statute in its context and I use context in its widest sense, which I have already indicated as including not only other enacting provisions of the same statute but its preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia and the mischief, which I can, by those and other legitimate means, discern the statute was intended to remedy. "it was further held in this very case as follows:"it was an elementary rule of interpretation that the intention of the legislature must be ascertained by reading the statute as a whole. "
( 9 ) IN Leader v. Duffey, (1888) 13 AC 294 at p. 301, it was held by Lord Halsbury as follows:"i agree that you must look at the whole instrument, unless there may be inaccurracy and inconsistency, you must, if you can, ascertain what is the meaning of the instrument taken as a whole in order to give effect, if it be possible to do so, to the intention of the framer of it. "
( 10 ) IN Canada Sugar Refining Co. v. R. , (1898) AC 735 at p. 741, it was observed by Lord Davey as follows:"every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses in the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject-matter. "
( 11 ) IN Newspapers Ltd. v. State Industrial Tribunal, AIR 1957 SC 532,536 it