An application under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 for making the award rule of the court is not barred by limitation, even if an application under Section 14(2) was not filed within 30 days from the date of notice of the award, in the absence of evidence of the date of service of the notice of the award.

( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order of Civil Judge, Gorakhpur, dated 25-9-1980 making the award rule of the court.

( 2 ) S. B. Singh appellant is the sole proprietor of the Firm Messrs. S. B. Singh and Sons which carries on business at Deoria. The Firm entered into a contract on 21-8-1970 with the appellant for the purchase of released bridge girders. It appears that later on a dispute arose between the parties and in pursuance of the terms of the contract the dispute was referred for adjudication to sri K. M. Mall, Deputy General Manager of the North Eastern Railway, Gorakhpur, who was appointed as the sole arbitrator without intervention of court Sri Mall gave his award on 1-12-1971 but he did not file the same in court. On July 10, 1972 an application was made on behalf of the defendant (plaintiff?) respondent to summon the award from the arbitrator and to make the same rule of the court. The application was purported to be filed under Sections 14 and 17 of the Arbitration Act 1940, but subsequently "sec. 14" was deleted and the application was treated only under Section 17 of the Act. The defendant appellant appeared before the court and contested the maintainability of the application under Section 17 of the Act.

( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellant urged that since the award had not been filed by the arbitrator suo motu in the court and since it was filed in the court on the plaintiff-respondents application under Section 17 (sic?) was not applicable instead Section 14 was attracted as it contained a prayer for filing of the award in the court for making the same rule of the court. He further contended that an application under Section 14 (2) could be made within 30 days from the date of notice of the award as contemplated by Article 119 fa) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Since the award was made on 1-12-1971 whereas the application for making the award rule of the court was made on July 10. 1972, the same was barred by time and the court had no jurisdiction to pass any decree or to make the award rule of the court. In support of his contention he placed reliance on Amod Kumar Verma v. Hari Prasad Burman (AIR 1958 All 720); AH Dabir v. Nawabzada M. Ali Kabir Khan (AIR 1964 All 185), Seth Ramrichpal Sirya v. Ajmer Traders (AIR 1963 Rai 87) and Frick India Ltd. v. Executive Engineer Project Public health Division No. 4 Chandigarh (AIR 1975 Punj and Har 39 ). We have considered the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and the authorities cited by the learned counsel but we are unable to find any merit in the contention. There is no dispute that an application under section 14 (2) filing award in the court and making the same rule of the court must be made within 30 days from the date of the service of notice of making of the award as contemplated by article 119 of the Limitation Act 1963. No. application is maintainable in law after the expiry of the pariod of limitation prescribed by Article 119 (a) of the Lim. Act. The limitation of 30 days for filing of the award in the court commences from the date of service of the notice of the making of the award, unless the notice of the award is served on the party concerned, the period of limitation cannot run against him. In the instant case there is no material on record to show the date on which the arbitrator may have served the notice of the award on the plaintiff-respondent. Appellants counsel has failed to point out any such date in the absence of which it is not possible to hold that the plaintiff-respondents application for filing the award in the court for making the same rule of the court was barred by time. In absence of the relevant date it is not possible to accept the appellants contention that the plaintiffs application was barred by time. The authorities cited by the counsel for the appellant need not be discussed in detail as in all these authorities it was held that for purpose of making application under Section 14 of the Act