DESAI, C. J.

( 1 ) MATHUR, J. , has referred to a larger bench the question, "is the order of the District Magistrate and also of the Commissioner and the State Government invalid simply because they did not take into consideration the needs of the tenant?" and this bench has been constituted to answer it. My answer to the question is emphatic no.

( 2 ) THERE was slight controversy on the question whether the Commissioner considered the needs of the petitioner tenant, but we are not concerned with that controversy because the whole petition has not been referred to this bench. It will be for Mathur, J. , to decide whether the petitioners needs were considered by the Commis--sioner or not we have to answer simply the question whether he was required to consider them.

( 3 ) THE question is with reference to the jurisdictions to be exercised by the District Magistrate, the Commissioner and the State Government under section 3 (1), 3 (3) and 7-F respectively of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947. The petitioner is a tenant since 1942 of a house which has now been purchased by opposite party No. 5 (to be referred to as "the opposite party", or "the landlord" ). The house is admittedly governed by the U. P. (Temporary)Control of Rent and Eviction Act (to be referred to as "the Act" ). The law before the Act was enacted was that contained in the Transfer of Property Act. Under it the landlord has absolute right to terminate the tenancy of the petitioner by a simple notice to quit without assigning any reason for requiring him to quit and to file a suit for his ejectment if he did not deliver possession on the termination of his tenancy. In a suit for ejectment by him the Court was simply concerned with the question whether the tenancy had been terminated or not and any question as to the need of the landlord to get the house vacated by the tenant, or of the need of the tenant to occupy the house, was wholly irrelevant. The tenant had a right to remain in possession only so long as he was a tenant. For now long he was to be a tenant was a question left entirely at the discretion of the landlord, unless there was some term to the contrary in the contract of tenancy. If the tenant wanted to restrict the landlords right to terminate his tenancy except on efflux of a certain period of time, or except on the happening of a certain event, it was for him to have this restriction incorporated in the contract of tenancy. Otherwise the landlord as the owner of the property had the right to terminate the tenancy at any time. Once the tenancy was "terminated the tenant was left with no right to remain in possession and the landlord was entitled to file a suit for his ejectment. The tenant could not resist his ejectment on the ground that the landlord did not need the house for his own purpose, or that he himself was unable to procure another house for his own purpose, or that he himself was unable to procure another house for occupation.

( 4 ) THE above law was changed by the Act which came into force in 1947. The object of the Act was, as stated in the statement of objects and reasons " to provide. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . of powers to control the letting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . of residential. . . . . . . . . accommodation and to prevent the eviction of the tenants therefrom. " it is stated in the preamble that "due to shortage of accommodation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . it is expedient to provide for the continuance. . . . . . of powers to control the letting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . of such accommodation and to prevent the eviction of tenant therefrom. " therefore all the restrictions that are imposed on the Landlords right to eject his tenant are those contained in the Act itself. His right is not subject to any restriction, not expressly or even impli-edly contained in the Act. One cannot question his right to eject a tenant unless one relies upon an express or implied provision in the Ac