1. Possession of unlicensed arms — Prosecution under Section 19(f) of the Indian Arms Act, 1878 — Challenge to the requirement of sanction under Section 29. (Para 1 , 2 )
Back
Next 
1962 Supreme(SC) 206
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
B.P. SINHA, C.J.I., P.B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, K.N. WANCHOO, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, AND T.L. VENKATARAMA AYYAR JJ.
Jia Lal, Appellant
Versus
The Delhi Administration, Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 69 of 1961.
Criminal Appeal No. 62 of 1960.
Bhagwana, Appellant
Versus
The State of U.P., Respondent.
Criminal Appeal No. 69 of 1961 with Criminal Appeal No. 62 of 1960.
Advocates appeared
Mr. Sarjoo Prasad, Sr. Advocate, (Mr. K. K. Sinha, Advocate with him), for Appellant; M/s. B. K. Khanna and P. D. Menon, Advocates, for Respondents.
In Criminal Appeal No. 62 of 1960.
M/s. R. K. Garg, D. P. Singh and S. C. Agarwala, Advocates of M/s. Ramamurthi and Co., for Appellant; M/s. G. C. Mathur and C. P. Lal, Advocates, for Respondent.
Advocates:
B.K.Khanna, C.P.LAL, D.P.Singh, G.C.MATHUR, K.K.SINHA, P.D.MENON, R.K.GARG, S.C.AGRAWAL, SARJU PRASAD
B.K.Khanna, C.P.LAL, D.P.Singh, G.C.MATHUR, K.K.SINHA, P.D.MENON, R.K.GARG, S.C.AGRAWAL, SARJU PRASAD
A procedural requirement for prosecution sanction based on obsolete geographical classifications violates Article 14. Such a procedural provision is severable from the substantive provision defining the offence, and its invalidity does not render the substantive offence void.
Headnote:(A) Indian Arms Act, 1878 - Sections 19(f) and 29 - Constitution of India - Article 14 - Possession of unlicensed arms - Requirement of sanction for prosecution - Geographical classification - Validity of classification - Severability of procedural and substantive provisions - A provision requiring sanction for prosecution in some areas but not in others, based on obsolete historical conditions, is discriminatory and violates Article 14 - Such a procedural provision is severable from the substantive provision defining the offence - Invalidity of a procedural section does not render the substantive offence void. (Paras 7, 13, 17 and 22)
(B) Interpretation of Statutes - Statement of objects and reasons - Not admissible for construing a section or determining the legislative intent regarding severability. (Paras 18-21)
Facts of the case:
Two appellants were convicted for possession of unlicensed arms. In one case, the prosecution proceeded without the sanction required by the procedural section for that specific geographical area. In the other case, no sanction was required because the offence was committed in an area exempt from such a requirement. The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the sanction requirement and argued that if the procedural section were void, the substantive provision creating the offence must also be void.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the geographical distinction for requiring sanction was based on political situations from over a century ago and no longer had any relevance to the object of the legislation, making it discriminatory and repugnant to Article 14. The court held that the entire procedural section must be struck down because the discrimination was inherent. However, it further found that the substantive provision defining the offence is distinct from the procedural provision governing the institution of proceedings.
Issues: Whether the procedural requirement of sanction for prosecution in certain areas but not others violates Article 14; and whether the invalidity of the procedural section renders the substantive provision defining the offence void and unenforceable.
Ratio Decidendi: A classification based on geographical boundaries that served a purpose in the distant past but lacks a reasonable nexus with the current object of the legislation is discriminatory and violates Article 14. Furthermore, a distinction exists between substantive law, which defines an offence, and adjectival or procedural law, which governs the process of prosecution. The invalidity of a procedural enactment generally does not affect the validity of a substantive provision, as the offence is complete regardless of the procedural requirements for prosecution.
Result: Appeals dismissed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Table of Contents
2. Constitutionality of Section 29 under Article 14 — Severability of Section 29 from Section 19(f) — Admissibility of statement of objects and reasons for determining legislative intent. (Para 3 )
3. Geographical distinction in Section 29 based on obsolete political conditions is discriminatory — Section 29 is procedural, while Section 19(f) is substantive. (Para 6 , 7 )
4. Does a provision requiring prosecution sanction in some geographical areas but not others violate Article 14?
Yes, if the geographical distinction is based on obsolete conditions and lacks a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation, it constitutes irrational discrimination and is void. (Para 6 , 7 )
Judgment
VENKATARAMA AIYAR, J. : The appellant in Criminal Appeal 69 of 1961 Jia Lal was searched by the Delhi Police on April 15, 1959 and was found to be in possession of an English pistol for which he held no licence. He was then prosecuted for an offence under S. 20 of the Indian Arms Act of 1878 (XI of 1878), hereinafter referred to as the Act before the Additional Sessions Judge Delhi who convicted him under S. 19(f) of the Act and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for nine months. No sanction for the prosecution had been obtained as required by S. 29 of the Act. The appellant then took the matter in appeal to the High Court of Punjab which confirmed his conviction but reduced the sentence to 4 1/2 months rigorous imprisonment. It is against this judgment that this appeal by special leave is directed.
2. The appellant in Criminal Appeal 62 of 1960 Bhagwana was searched by the Saharanpur Police on August 6, 1956 and was found to be in possession of a country-made pistol and four cartridges for which he held no licence. He was prosecuted before the City Magistrate, Saharanpur under S. 19(f) of the Act and was convicted and sentenced to six months rigorous imprisonment. No sanction was obtained for his prosecution, obviously because under S. 29 of the Act it is not required when the offences are committed in certain areas and Saharanpur is within those areas. The appellant preferred an appeal against his conviction and sentence to the Sessions Judge, Saharanpur but the appeal was dismissed and the conviction and sentence were confirmed. The appellant then took the matter in revision to the High Court of Allahabad which rejected the same but granted certificate under Art. 134(1) of the Constitution. This is how this appeal comes before us. Though the two appeals arise out of two different prosecutions unconnected with each other, they were heard together as the same questions of law arise for determination in both.
3. The first question that arises for our decision is whether S. 29 of the Act is unconstitutional and void as contravening Art. 14, in that it requires sanction for prosecution for offences under the Act, when they are committed in some areas, but not in others. Section 29 of the Act is as follows:-
"Where an offence punishable under Section 19, Clause (f), has been committed within three months from the date on which this Act comes into force in any State, district or place to which Section 32, Clause 2 of Act XXXI of 1960 applies at such date, or where such an offence has been committed in any part of India not being such a district, State or place no proceedings shall be instituted against any person in respect of such offence without the previous sanction of the Magistrate of the district or, in a presidency town of the Commissioner of Police."
For a correct understanding of the true scope of the sanction, it is necessary to refer to the history of the Legislation relating to it.
4. The earliest enactment dealing with this subject is the Arms and Ammunition and Military Stores Act 18 of 184l which came into force on August 30, 1841 and that prohibited the export of arms and ammunition out of the territories belonging to the East India Company and enacted certain prohibitions as regards the storing of ammunition. This Act was repealed by Act 13 of 1852. After the uprising against the British rule in 1857, the Government felt that a more stringent law was required for preventing insurrections and maintaining order and so a new Act was passed, Act 28 of 1857. This Act is a comprehensive one dealing with many matters not dealt with in previous legislation and contains elaborate provisions as regards the manufacture, import, sale, possession and use of arms and ammunition. Of particular relevance to the present discussion is S. 24 of this Act which empowered the Governor-General to order general search for arms and ammunition in any district. In exercise of the powers conferred by this section, the Governor-Genera
