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1961 Supreme(All) 215

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
B. Mukerji and J. Sahai, JJ.
SUKHANAND MATHURA PRASAD - Appellant
Versus
BAIKUNTH NATH - Respondents
Letters Patent Appeal 13 Of 1952
Decided On : 11/29/1961

Advocates Appeared:
BABU RAM AVASTHI, K.C.SAXENA

Headnote:

EXECUTION OF DECREE - LIMITATION - STEP-IN-AID OF EXECUTION - OBJECTION TO SALE - WHETHER A STEP-IN-AID OF EXECUTION - ARTICLE 182, LIMITATION ACT.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant firm, Sukhanand Mathura Prasad, obtained a decree for money in 1934. In 1945, they filed an application for execution of the decree. The judgment-debtor raised a question of limitation, contending that the application was barred since it was filed more than three years from the date of the order striking off the execution case in part satisfaction in 1939.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the objections filed by the appellant firm to the sale held in execution of the decree of the attaching creditor, Beni Ram Ganesh Prasad, were a step-in-aid of execution of the appellant's decree. The court further held that the final order passed in the execution second appeal, which set aside the sale, was a final order passed in an application made for execution within the meaning of Article 182 of the Limitation Act.

Issues: 1. Whether the objections filed by the appellant firm to the sale held in execution of the decree of the attaching creditor were a step-in-aid of execution of the appellant's decree. 2. Whether the final order passed in the execution second appeal, which set aside the sale, was a final order passed in an application made for execution within the meaning of Article 182 of the Limitation Act.

Ratio Decidendi: 1. A step-in-aid of execution is a step that furthers the execution of the decree initiated by the person who took the step, not whether it was a step to further the execution initiated by his rival. 2. The provisions of Article 182 of the Limitation Act do not speak of the execution by any particular decree-holder but they speak of execution of a decree.

Final Decision: The court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the learned single Judge, holding that the execution application which had been initiated by firm Sukhanand Mathura Prasad was not barred by time.

MUKERJI, J.

( 1 ) THIS is a special appeal arising out of a decision made by Mr. Justice Mushtaq Ahmad by which decision the learned Judge modified an order of the court below when the order was made the subject-matter of an execution second appeal in this Court. While deciding the appeal Mr. Justice Mushtaq Ahmad granted leave to file a special appeal, and this is how this appeal is before us.

( 2 ) ON the 18th April, 1934, the appellant firm Sukhanand Mathura Prasad obtained a decree for money in their suit No. 176 of 1933. The decree was for a sum of Rs. 4000/- odd. Applications for execution were made in respect of the decree, and we are concerned in this appeal with the application which was made on the 10th Oct. 1945. The question which falls for determination is one of limitation and for purposes of determining that question, or even for the purpose of understanding the question properly, it is necessary to state that there was a firm called Beni ram Ganesh Prasad who had obtained a decree for Rs. 500/- odd in a Small Cause Court suit against firm Sukhanand Mathura Prasad and that Beni Ram Ganesh Prasad had attached the decree of Sukhanand Mathura Prasad which was under execution. Firm Beni Ram Ganesh prasad applied that they be permitted to continue the execution application as a decree-holder of that execution and this was allowed. In this execution a house which had already been attached in the execution which had been initiated by firm Sukhanand Mathura Prasad was put up for sale and it was sold on the 20th July, 1939 for Rs. 680/- and it was purchased by firm Beni Ram ganesh Prasad, the attaching creditor of Sukhanand Mathura Prasad. After giving credit for the amount of the decree the balance was filed in court and an order was made on the 24th October 1939 striking off this execution in part satisfaction.

( 3 ) AFTER the sale Sukhanand Mathura Prasad filed objections to the sale on the ground that the sale could not take place inasmuch as the decree of the attaching creditor Bem Ram Ganesh prasad had been stayed under the provisions of Act X of 1937 by an order dated the 8th October, 1938. The Civil Judge, who tried the objections preferred on behalf of Sukhanand Mathura prasad, dismissed the objections on the 16th October, 1939. but on appeal against the decision of the Civil Judge the learned District Judge allowed the objections and set aside the sale by his order dated the 28th November, 1940. Beni Ram Ganesh Prasad brought up this decision of the learned District Judge to this Court in second appeal and the second appeal was dismissed by this court on January 29, 1943, with the result that the sale which had taken place on the 20th July, 1939, was set aside and all consequences which follow on the setting aside of a sale came into being. The order of the 24th October 1939, whereby the execution case was struck off in part satisfaction also was put in jeopardy by the order made in the second appeal which affirmed the order of the District Judge referred to above by us.

( 4 ) ON the 10th October, 1945, the present appellant firm Sukhanand Mathura Prasad made their application for execution and, as we have said, it is this application out of which this appeal has arisen. By this application firm Sukhanand Mathura Prasad sought the sale of the same house which had been earlier sold in the decree of the attaching creditor, namely the Small Cause Court decree of firm Beni Ram Ganesh Prasad. The judgment-debtor raised a question of limitation for he contended that limitation in respect of the execution initiated by the aforementioned application had to be computed from the 24th of October 1939 and since the execution application was beyond three years from that date the execution was barred. This leads us to the question as to whether time would begin to run in respect of the present execution from the 24th october 1939, or from some other later date so as to bring this application within limitation. The article of


















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