Judgment

SARKAR, J. : This appeal arises out of an application for execution of a decree for money and the only question is whether the application was made within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act.

2. The decree was passed in favour of one Venkatachalam Chettiar on May 9, 1935, against the appellants and certain other persons. On February 3, 1936, Venkatachalam Chettiar transferred the decree to his mother, Meenakshi Achi, by an assignment in writing never having tried to execute it himself. Soon thereafter, namely, on March 26, 1936, a creditor of Venkatachalam Chettiar presented a petition under the Provincial Insolvency Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act ) for adjudicating him an insolvent on the ground that the transfer of the decree to Meenakshi Achi was a fraudulent preference and as such an act of insolvency. This petition remained pending for a considerable time and ultimately on January 7, 1939, an order was made on its adjudicating Venkatachalam Chettiar an insolvent. By that order respondent No. 1, the Official Receiver of Ramanathapuram, was appointed the receiver in insolvency and the insolvent s estate vested in him. This order was based on the finding that the transfer of the decree by Venkatachalam Chettiar to Meenakshi Achi was a fraudulent preference and an act of insolvency. On January 26, 1942, the receiver made an application in the insolvency proceedings for an order annulling the transfer of the decree by the insolvent to Meenakshi Achi and on this application an order was made on April 9, 1943, under S. 54 of the Act annulling that transfer.

3. In the meantime, Meenakshi Achi had made two applications for execution of the decree as the assignee of it and a reference to them is necessary. The first of these applications was made on December 14, 1936, for an order recognising her as the assignee of the decree and for its execution against some of the judgment-debtors. This application was disposed of by an order made on September 27, 1937, recognising her right to execute the decree as the assignee and directing a certain compromise made presumably with the judgment-debtors concerned, to be recorded. The terms of this compromise are now relevant for the purpose of the appeal. Thereafter, on August 2, 1940 Meenakshi Achi as the assignee of the decree made another application for its execution and this application for its execution and this application was disposed of by an order made on September 30, 1940, dismissing it for default of prosecution. It will be remembered that it was after these applications and the orders thereon had been made that the order annulling the assignment of the decree of Meenakshi Achi was passed.

4. After the order annulling the transfer of the decree to Meenakshi Achi had been made, the receiver considering himself then entitled to the decree, made an application for its execution on September 27, 1943. It is this application which has given rise to the present appeal.

5. The executing court dismissed the application as having been made beyond the time prescribed by the Limitation Act. On appeal, the High Court at Madras set aside the order of the executing court and held that the application was within time. Some of the judgment-debtors have now come up in appeal to this Court. The appeal is contested by the receiver, the respondent No. 1. The other respondents among whom are the remaining judgment-debtors or their successors-in-interest, have not appeared.

6. Applications for execution like the present one are governed by Art. 182 of the Limitation Act. That article provides a period of three years within which the application must be made. The article prescribes different points of time for different cases from which the period is to commence running. The first point of time so prescribed is the date of the decree. The fifth point of time prescribed is expressed in these words:

"(Where the application next hereinafter mentioned has been made) the date of the final ord