The irrevocability of a license under Section 60 of the Easements Act is limited to the actual site on which the construction stands and does not extend to the whole of the open land occupied by the licensee.

( 1 ) THIS is a plaintiffs second appeal against a decision of the Additional Civil Judge of farrukhabad dismissing his suit for possession of a house and the land surrounding it which has been described as a sahan. The plaintiff Sukh Basi Lal alleged in his plaint that he is the owner of the house situate in the abadi of the village Pipergaori in the district of Farrukhabad, that this house was let out to the defendant Durjan Singh on rent, that the defendant was asked to vacate the house but refused to do so; hence the suit.

( 2 ) THE defendant contested it and denied that he was a tenant, though he admitted that the plaintiff is the owner of the property in dispute. He alleged that about 35 years ago he built the house on the site of a Khandhal with the permission of the plaintiff who had allowed him to live in it ewer since. The defendant pleaded that as he had constructed the house at his own expense he was a licences whose licence was protected by Section 60 of the Easements Act and irrevocable.

( 3 ) THE trial court believed the plaintiffs version and held that the defendant was a tenant; consequently it passed the decree against the tenant and for damages. On appeal the learned judge took a contrary view of the evidence and rejected the plaintiffs case about the tenancy as false and believed the defendant that he had been permitted by the plaintiff to construct the house on the plaintiffs khandahal about 35 years prior to the suit and had been living in it ever since. Accordingly, it held that the defendant was protected by Section 60 of the Easements Act and dismissed the plaintiffs suit in toto. The learned Judge also held that the suit was barred by limitation. The plaintiff has now come to this Court in second appeal.

( 4 ) BEFORE considering the arguments of the parties on merits I would like to dispose of a contention raised by Mr. K. C. Saxena learned counsel for the respondent in the course of argument which, however, is in the nature of a preliminary objection that the plaintiff has no longer any locus standi to maintain this suit after the passing of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. Mr. Saxena contended that the property in dispute, being an estate within the meaning of Section 3 of the Z. A. and L. R. Act. , vested in the State after 1st July 1952 and was simultaneously settled with the defendant under Section 9 of the Act. Mr. Saxena pointed out that the plaintiff had sued for possession of the land which is an implied admission that the defendant is in possession. Therefore, according to counsel, the defendant held this land together with the area appurtenant thereto and it shall be deemed to fee settled with him by the State Government under Section 9, and the plaintiff has lost his right to possession even it he had any. In reply to this preliminary objection, Mr. R. C. Ghatak, learned counsel for the appellant, denied that the land in dispute is an estate within the meaning of Section 3. Counsel quoted from the opening words of the plaint in which this land is described as under the ownership (milkiyat) of the plaintiff. Mr. Ghatak stated that the plaintiff is not a zamindar and there is nothing on the record to prove that he is Counsel for the respondent has argued that the very fact that the land has been described as situate in a mauza raises a presumption that it must form part of an estate within the meaning of Section 3, I do not think, that any presumption can be made in law that the plaintiff was the zamirtdar or that the land was an estate. Mr. Saxena then relied on an entry in the Khasra of the abadi relating to the house and the land appurtenant to it. This entry described the land and the house as belonging to Sukhabasi Lal (the present plaintiff ). I do not think that an entry in the Khasra is conclusive proof that any plot of land entered in it is an estate within the meaning of Section 3, or that the owner was an intermediary and not a cultivator. It is