( 1 ) I respectfully differ from the judgments of ray brothers Mukerji find Dwivedi and consider that the appeal should be allowed and the suit bought against the appellants by the respondents should be dismissed. The findings of fact which cannot be challenged in second appeal are that the respondents were the owners of the constructions made on the land possessed by the appellants as their riyayas, that is as licensees, that they never abandoned the village, their rights as licensees and the constructions but continued to be the owners of the constructions and the licensees of the site and that during their absence the appellants unlawfully took possession of the constructions and their site, demolished, the constructions and included the site in their own cattle-shed or constructed a cattle-shed over it. On these findings the suit of the respondent was decreed by the trial court and they were ordered to be restored to possession over the sits of the constructions. There could have been no question of their being restored to possession over the constructions because they did not exist at all, The decree was passed on 19-1-1952 when the U. P. Tenancy Act, was in force. It was appealed from by the appellants, and during its pendency the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act came into force. The lower appellate court on 17-7-1953 affirmed the decree of the trial court, but without considering the effect of Section 9 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act on the rights of the parties. The appellants did not base any argument on the provisions of the section before it. They preferred a second appeal and now contended that the cattle-shed should continue to belong to them and that the site should be deemed to be settled with them by the state Government. The position on 1-7-1952 (the date on which the new Act came into force) was that the respondents had a decree in their favour for possession over the site only. Their constructions had already been demolished and there was no question of their holding the decree for possession over them There remained only the site to which they were entitled as licensees, and they held a decree only for restoration of possession over it. There did stand a construction on it, namely the cattle-shed, but that admittedly belonged to the appellants they might have unlawfully trespassed on the site of the constructions belonging to the respondents, unlawfully demolished them and unlawfully constructed a cattle-shed over it, still the respondent did not become owners of the cattle-shed. On account of the decree for possession over the site the cattle-shed might go to them along with the site in the execution of the decree, but it did not mean that they became owners of the cattle-shed. If a trespasses upon the land of b and places his chattels on it, or makes a construction on it at his own expouse, he remains the owner of the chattels or the construction and neither can be said to belong to the owner of the land. The law does not make b owner of the chattels or the construction merely because he is the owner of the land; otherwise the would be entitled to a decree for possession, over the land and for possession over the construction and would not sure simply for possession over the land as he invariably does. Though the suit of the respondents was decreed, it was in appeal, and, since Section 9 of the zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act came into force on 1-7-52, the appellate court was bound to consider its provisions before deciding the appeal. It had not merely to see whether the decree passed by the lower court was Correct or not; it had to deal with the matter as if it were itself trying the suit. When the only constructions that food on the site belonged to, and were in the occupation of, the appellants, only the appellants could continue to own and be in occupation of them; the respondents, who were not the owners and were not even in possession of them, could no